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Online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, once a marketplace teeming with retail
investors, is now dominated by sophisticated institutional investors and banks. This
seismic shift in investor base has been coupled with significant growth for the legacy
P2P lenders and new entrants. A new regulatory approach is needed to grapple with
these changes—one that focuses on consumer protection, as opposed to one that seeks to
protect the sophisticated investors purchasing these loans. Fortunately, such an
approach is readily available in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s fintech
charter. This Comment surveys the significant changes that have occurred in the P2P
lending sector over the past ten years, as well as the risks and benefits to consumers
attendant to the rapid growth in this relatively new form of lending. After surveying
the current and proposed regulatory approaches toward P2P lending, this Comment
explains why a national fintech charter is the best approach to ensuring that consumers
who rely on these loans receive the full protections guaranteed by federal law.
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INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending is one of the fastest growing and most
significant segments of the broad area of financial technology (fintech).1
Today, P2P lenders account for 36% of all unsecured consumer loans made in
the United States.2 Attendant to this growth has been an enormous shift in
the business model of P2P lending. The investor base of P2P lenders, once
comprised primarily of individual retail investors, is now dominated by
sophisticated institutional investors and banks.3 Despite this seismic shift, the
regulatory approach to P2P lending remains one focused on the investor, with
little appreciation for the risks this area of lending poses to consumers. The
current approach of providing the greatest protection to the investor class
best able to fend for itself is irrational and in need of significant reform. A
new approach is needed, one that ensures compliance with consumer
protection laws and learns and adapts to the unique risks posed by this
innovative area of lending.

1 Online P2P lending, which is the focus of this Comment, “can be defined as any transaction
arranged using the Internet in which one or more individuals lend money to one or more other
individuals.” Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online Peer-to-Peer Lending in the
Aftermath of Dodd–Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 485, 491 (2012). The key distinction between P2P lending and traditional lending is
that “individuals, rather than institutions, stand on both sides of the transaction.” Id. at 491-92.
2 See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 28–41 and accompanying text (discussing the shift toward sophisticated
investors as the dominant purchasers of P2P lending notes).
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Prior to its current form, P2P lending seemed like a technology that could
fundamentally shift the paradigm of lending.4 Many saw it as a means to finally
disintermediate lending and borrowing, an exciting prospect in the
postfinancial crisis world. In light of this potential, a surprisingly robust
academic debate emerged from 2010–2013 over the appropriate regulatory
structure for this relatively niche area of lending.5 Some of the earliest and
most vocal participants in this debate directed their greatest criticism at the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and its decision to regulate
this lending under the securities laws.6 Rather, the newly created Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) seemed to be the regulator of choice, for
both industry and academics. The overarching concern for all, though, was the
idea that this new technology must be fostered, rather than extinguished, by
zealous regulators.
But 2020 is a very different year than 2013. Despite some indications that
the CFPB or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) might step
in to directly regulate P2P lending, these agencies never did so, and the SEC
remains the only active federal player in the field. However, the business of
P2P lending has changed significantly and barely resembles its original
promise. Today, the investor base of these platforms is almost entirely
dominated by sophisticated institutional investors and banks. Long gone are
the days of mom-and-pop retail investors seeking out these platforms for
investment alternatives. Some things have stayed the same. The innovative use
of alternative data by these P2P lenders has been a far more consistent thread
in this field and has shown itself to be a promising new form of underwriting.
However, the use of this data, while originally deployed on a large scale by
P2P lenders, no longer remains unique to them.
Not only has the business model of P2P lenders changed dramatically but
so to have the laws that regulate these entities. The securities laws saw
significant change in the form of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
(JOBS Act), which offered regulatory relief in securities laws compliance.7
Federal and state regulators have also sought to build regulatory structures
4 See, e.g., Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1, at 501 (“Online P2P lending is hot. The Harvard Business
Review called it a ‘breakthrough idea of 2009.’”); John Sviokla, Forget Citibank—Borrow from Bob, in
Breakthrough Ideas for 2009, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 2009), https://hbr.org/2009/02/breakthrough-ideasfor-2009 [https://perma.cc/J9DK-3X4C] (“The financial crisis will trigger an increase in peer-to-peer
financing. Already Lending Club and other organizations are demonstrating how novel approaches to
credit scoring . . . can reduce risk.”); Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 452 (2011) (“P2P lending hints at a world with the benefits of intermediation
but none of the costs.”).
5 See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
6 See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 86–92 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory relief from the securities
laws under the JOBS Act through Rule 506(c) private placements).
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around fintech entities generally in the form of new and innovative banking
charters and regulatory “sandboxes,” which are intended to provide a variety of
regulatory relief. Additionally, as fintech companies have grown and become
more established market participants, particularly in the lending area, these
entities have become more comfortable with the traditional financial regulatory
regime. Indeed, the largest P2P lender in the United States, LendingClub, very
recently announced a proposed agreement to acquire a federally chartered bank
for the express purpose of creating a direct relationship with federal regulators
and obtaining access to insured deposits.8
Despite these changes, the actual mandatory regulatory regime governing
P2P lenders has remained largely unchanged since 2013. Some recent
academic literature has sought to grapple with these changes and the effect of
these changes on the regulatory regime.9 In contrast to other scholarship in
this area, this Comment argues that the best regulatory approach going
forward is one based around fintech chartering. It describes the changes that
have occurred in P2P lending and pragmatically assesses how the regulatory
regime around P2P lending should look in light of these changes. Concerning
investor-side regulation of P2P lending, this Comment takes the position that
early SEC regulation of P2P lending notes had a detrimental effect on the
industry. However, this negative impact has since been strongly mitigated by
the new private placement rules under the JOBS Act, thereby obviating many
of the critiques leveled against SEC regulation by early legal commentators
in this area. Concerning borrower-side regulation of P2P lending, this
Comment argues that P2P lending, as with all lending, presents significant
consumer protection risks. Despite this, regulation in this area remains
wholly underprotective. This Comment argues that the most feasible remedy
to this problem is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC)
fintech charter.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of P2P lending. This Part
discusses the business model of P2P lending and pays particular attention to
the emergence of institutional investors in this area. Part I also includes a
discussion of the consumer benefits and risks associated with P2P lending.
Part II examines in greater depth the current regulatory regime around
P2P lending. This Part first discusses how P2P lending notes are regulated
under the securities laws. Next, this Part examines how P2P lenders are
indirectly regulated by the federal banking agencies through the lenders’
8 Press Release, LendingClub, LendingClub Announces Acquisition of Radius Bank (Feb. 18,
2020), https://ir.lendingclub.com/file/Index?KeyFile=402858346 [https://perma.cc/65V2-ULDN].
Notably, this proposed acquisition remains subject to approval by federal regulators. Id.
9 See generally William S. Warren, The Frontiers of Peer-to-Peer Lending: Thinking About a New
Regulatory Approach, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 298 (2016) (discussing the systemic risks posed by
the increased presence of institutional investors in P2P marketplaces).
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relationships with state and federally chartered banks. This Part explains how
this indirect regulation does ensure a certain level of compliance with federal
lending laws but is substantially less comprehensive than the direct oversight
performed on chartered institutions. Finally, this Part briefly discusses state
oversight of P2P lenders, with a focus on the integrated regulatory regime
being pushed by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS).
Part III argues that the OCC fintech charter represents the best regulatory
option for P2P lenders. This Part discusses and rejects the argument that
regulation under the securities laws alone is sufficient. This Part further argues
that the current combination of federal regulation of P2P lenders as thirdparty service providers and state-level regulation is underprotective and
inefficient. This Part then provides an overview of the OCC fintech charter
and recent legal challenges to the charter. This Part concludes with a normative
argument that the OCC fintech charter represents the best available option
for consumers, P2P lenders, and the broader U.S. economy.
I. THE BUSINESS OF PEER-TO-PEER LENDING
P2P lending10 has gained a significant portion of the consumer lending
market in a very short time and this growth is anticipated to continue.11
Today, consumer P2P lending is dominated by LendingClub and Prosper,
though Upstart is a newer entrant that has grown rapidly. P2P lending has
also expanded over the past five years or so to encompass small business
lending, auto title lending, and student loans. The business of P2P lending,
and the attendant regulation of this business, was of particular focus in law
journals between 2010 and 2013.12 However, while the overall structure of P2P

10 This Comment sometimes uses the alternative term “marketplace lending.” Technically,
marketplace lending is a broader category of lending of which P2P lending is a part. It refers to “nonbank
financial platforms that leverage technology to reach potential borrowers, evaluate creditworthiness, and
facilitate loans.” Fintech Series: Marketplace Lending, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/events-calendar/2016/06/fintech-series-marketplace-lending [https://perma.cc/KX7L-F4
NN] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). Therefore, it includes online, nonbank lenders that do not have a P2P
component. See id. Because this Comment is focused on the consumer protection risks related to P2P
lending, much of its normative recommendations are easily transferrable to regulating marketplace
lending broadly.
11 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, PEER PRESSURE: HOW PEER-TO-PEER LENDING
PLATFORMS ARE TRANSFORMING THE CONSUMER LENDING INDUSTRY 1 (2015), https://www.pwc.
com/us/en/consumer-finance/publications/assets/peer-to-peer-lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NLR-FH
PD] (stating that P2P platforms issued only $5.5 billion in loans in 2014 and predicting that the P2P
lending market could reach $150 billion in loans by 2025).
12 See generally, e.g., Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1 (arguing for a multiagency regulatory
approach to online P2P lending); Paul Slattery, Square Pegs in a Round Hole: SEC Regulation of Online
Peer-to-Peer Lending and the CFPB Alternative, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 233 (2013) (arguing that P2P
online lending should be exempted from SEC regulation due to compliance costs, barriers to entry,
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lending as a two-sided platform with investors and borrowers on each side
remains, the business model of P2P lending has changed significantly since
that time. In its earliest iterations, P2P lending often relied on “soft
information” in making credit decisions.13 This feature is largely nonexistent
today, though the use of “alternative data” continues.14 Additionally, while the
original models of P2P lending centered around small individual investors,
the investing side of P2P lending is increasingly dominated by large,
sophisticated institutional investors and banks.
These changes significantly altered the risk profile of P2P lending. The
increasing presence of large, sophisticated investors in this area reduces the
risk of investor harm as these parties are better able to fend for themselves. At
the same time, the increased presence of these sophisticated parties and the
decreased reliance on “soft” factors results in a P2P lending model that is
substantially similar to more traditional consumer lending. P2P lending also
poses some unique risks to consumers. For example, the use of nontraditional
data in lending decisions presents risks of consumer harm that current law
does not address. While acknowledging these risks, the passage of time from
2013 has allowed greater empirical research on the broader effects of P2P
lending. Much of this research indicates that P2P lending has potentially
significant consumer benefits. An analysis of these risks and benefits serves as
an important foundation in addressing the proper regulatory regime for this
area of lending.
This Part first provides a brief background on the business of P2P lending.
It then describes the general shift away from small retail investors toward
larger and more sophisticated investors, as well as the increasingly complex
products offered by P2P lenders. Following this discussion, this Part looks to
the benefits and risks posed by P2P lending. The analysis of benefits and risks
is informed both by empirical studies and risks inherent in the evolving
business model of these lenders.

and consumer risks); Verstein, supra note 4 (arguing for CFPB regulation over SEC regulation for
P2P lending).
13 “Soft information” typically means data beyond that found in a credit report, such as “nonstandardized answers to questions . . . or even pictures, which were an important part of the ‘peerto-peer’ aspect that was initially supported.” Boris Vallée & Yao Zeng, Marketplace Lending: A New
Banking Paradigm?, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 1939, 1945 n.8 (2019).
14 See Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, The Roles of Alternative Data and Machine Learning
in Fintech Lending: Evidence from the LendingClub Consumer Platform 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.,
Working Paper No. 18-15, 2019) (“[O]ver the years, alternative sources of information have been
increasingly used by fintech lenders to evaluate credit applications.”). “Alternative data” generally
means data other than that typically used by traditional lenders, such as FICO scores and debt-toincome ratios. Alternative data can include utility payments, rent payments, education, and other
internet footprint information. Id. at 2-3. This data is often used by these lenders in conjunction
with machine learning and artificial intelligence to make credit decisions. Id. at 1.
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A. Fundamentals
P2P lending, at its most basic level, is any transaction in which individuals
lend and borrow small amounts of money from other individuals.15 As early as
2005, online platforms began appearing to facilitate these transactions.16 These
online platforms disrupted traditional consumer lending through
disintermediation. Before marketplace lending, most consumers seeking small
dollar loans would obtain such loans through a financial institution. The
financial institution funded these loans with deposits taken from the
community, and the institution earned its money off the spread between lowyielding deposits and higher-yielding loans. P2P lenders offered the
opportunity for consumers to go directly to the community to obtain their loans.
As originally conceived, this model would mean higher rates of return for
investors, lower costs of borrowing for consumers, and a reduction in transaction
costs that would accrue to both borrowers and lenders rather than banks.
Although the way P2P lenders originated loans during the early stages of
this technology varied in significant and interesting ways,17 all P2P lenders
now operate in essentially the same manner. Borrowers apply for a loan
through the P2P lender’s online platform. Both Prosper and LendingClub
utilize proprietary algorithms and models that analyze borrower risk based on
alternative information including “behavioral data, transactional data and
employment information to supplement traditional risk assessment tools, such
as FICO scores, to assess a borrower’s risk profile.”18 This data is utilized to
assign loan grades, loan amounts, and interest rates, which are then listed on
the P2P lender’s investor marketplace.19 Once the P2P lender receives
sufficient investor commitments, it originates the loan through an issuing bank
(both Prosper and LendingClub most often use WebBank) and issues the loan
to the borrower.20 The P2P lender then uses the funds committed by investors

Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1, at 491.
See id. at 492 (noting that the earliest online P2P lenders started in Europe in 2005).
For background on the original business models of these lenders, see Jefferson Duarte et al.,
Trust and Credit: The Role of Appearance in Peer-to-Peer Lending, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 2455, 2458-59
(2012) (discussing the auction process originally used by Prosper); Mingfeng Lin et al., Judging
Borrowers by the Company They Keep: Friendship Networks and Information Asymmetry in Online Peerto-Peer Lending, 59 MGMT. SCI. 17, 18 (2013) (discussing the role of lender “friendships” in the early
P2P lending origination process).
18 LendingClub Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 9 (Feb. 20, 2019) [hereinafter LendingClub
10-K]; accord Prosper Marketplace, Inc. & Prosper Funding LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Mar.
28, 2019) [hereinafter Prosper 10-K].
19 LendingClub 10-K, supra note 18, at 5-10; Prosper 10-K, supra note 18, at 6.
20 LendingClub 10-K, supra note 18, at 8; Prosper 10-K, supra note 18, at 7-8. In light of
LendingClub’s recent proposed acquisition of a federally chartered bank, it is likely that it will no longer
need to rely on an issuing bank. Press Release, LendingClub, supra note 8. However, it is difficult to
anticipate how the LendingClub business model will change until that acquisition is completed.
15
16
17
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to purchase the loan back from the issuing bank.21 Originally, P2P lenders
provided investors with an indirect security interest in the loan payments.22
However, the SEC disallowed P2P lenders from providing such a security
interest.23 As a result, notes purchased on a P2P platform are not insured and
are generally unsecured.24
Investors have flocked to these loans. P2P lending has grown rapidly and
is now big business. In 2010, fintech companies in the marketplace lending
area originated less than 1% of consumer loans in the United States.25 By the
end of 2018, marketplace lenders, with P2P lenders driving much of the
growth, originated 38% of all loans in the $138 billion U.S. consumer debt
market.26 And there is no reason to believe that this growth will slow down. A
PwC analysis estimated that the P2P lending market alone could reach $150
billion or more by 2025.27
B. The Rise of the Sophisticated Investor
In addition to transforming the market for consumer loans, the business
model for P2P lending has changed significantly itself. Large investors have
taken notice of the rapid growth and innovative underwriting practices of
these lenders. A LendingClub memo showed that only 2% of its standard
program loans went to institutional investors in 2012 and that retail investors
were the predominant parties funding loans in 2010 and 2011.28 In stark
contrast, during 2018, self-directed retail investors accounted for less than 10%
of loan investments on LendingClub.29 Banks, institutional investors, thirdparty managed funds, and LendingClub itself accounted for all other

LendingClub 10-K, supra note 18, at 8; Prosper 10-K, supra note 18, at 8.
Slattery, supra note 12, at 251.
See id. at 259 (discussing how the SEC disallowed P2P lenders from providing security
interests in the notes because it was contrary to the Rule 415 requirement that the P2P lenders be
the sole issuer of the notes).
24 LendingClub 10-K, supra note 18, at 28.
25 Hannah Levitt, Personal Loans Surge to Record High, BLOOMBERG (July 3, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-03/personal-loans-surge-to-a-record-as-fintechfirms-lead-the-way [https://perma.cc/TJE4-WV6F].
26 See Fintech Continues to Drive Personal Loan Growth, TRANSUNION (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://newsroom.transunion.com/fintechs-continue-to-drive-personal-loans-to-record-levels/ [https://
perma.cc/ZR9N-62GA] (reporting that personal loan balances increased to $138 billion and “[f]intech
loans now comprise 38% of all unsecured personal loan balances”); see also Levitt, supra note 25 (“Webbased firms like LendingClub, Prosper Marketplace Inc. and closely held Social Finance Inc. are driving
the expansion of personal loans.”).
27 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 11, at 1.
28 Benjamin Lo, It Ain’t Broke: The Case for Continued SEC Regulation of P2P Lending, 6 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 87, 102 n.73 (2016) (citation omitted).
29 LendingClub 10-K, supra note 18, at 72.
21
22
23

2020]

Twenty-First Century Financial Regulation

1021

purchases.30 This trend is even more dramatic for Prosper, where 94% of its
loans are funded through its “whole loan channel,” which is only available to
accredited investors, many of which are institutional investors and banks.31
Additionally, smaller P2P lenders like Upstart and Funding Circle make their
loans only available to accredited investors in the first place.32
Some in the legal academic literature have acknowledged this trend among
P2P lenders along with its accompanying risks.33 However, little attention has
been paid to how the increased presence of institutional investors should alter
the regulatory approach to P2P lenders. I argue that the result of this trend is
that these platforms, once dominated by small retail investors, are becoming
more enmeshed with and similar to traditional financial intermediaries.
The influence of institutional and other sophisticated investors in P2P
lending is also reflected in these lenders’ increased focus on more complex
financial instruments. LendingClub, for example, now securitizes a portion of
its unsecured loans into asset-backed securitizations.34 It also developed a
financial instrument, called CLUB certificates, which are targeted specifically
at institutional investors and are collateralized passthrough securities that are
exempt from securities registration as private placements.35 This trend toward
complex securitized instruments that are far beyond the investing expertise of
the average retail investor further signals the trend of the P2P lending industry
toward traditional financial intermediaries.

30 The exact breakdown for Q4 2018 is as follows: banks acquired 41%, institutional investors
acquired 19%, third-party managed funds acquired 16%, and LendingClub acquired the remaining
18%. Id. Self-directed individual investors acquired only 6% of loans originated in that quarter. Id.
31 Prosper 10-K, supra note 18, at 6, F-46. An accredited investor is generally, though not always, a
person with net worth greater than $1 million (excluding net worth associated with a personal residence)
or a person with individual income over $200,000 or joint income over $300,000. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2019). For additional categories of accredited investors, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
32 See Frequently Asked Questions, FUNDING CIRCLE, https://www.fundingcircle.com/us/invest/faq/
[https://perma.cc/ZC2K-8BZV] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (stating that Funding Circle notes are only
available to accredited investors); How Do I Become an Investor?, UPSTART, https://investorhelp.
upstart.com/7973-investing-on-upstart/83780-how-do-i-become-an-investor [https://perma.cc/YJC5-2R
2Y] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (stating that individuals must confirm that they are accredited investors
to invest through Upstart).
33 Much of the existing writing on the role of institutional investors in P2P lending continues
to focus on systemic risks rather than consumer protection risks. See, e.g., Jacob Gregory Shulman,
Note, Regulating Online Marketplace Lending: To be a Bank or Not to be a Bank?, 44 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 163, 165 (2018) (explaining that the article assesses concerns of small and
medium-sized enterprises in marketplace lending); Warren, supra note 9, at 309 (arguing that P2P
lending “is threatened whenever the pool of potential lenders is restricted to those who qualify as
accredited investors” and that growth in secondary markets and securitization for P2P loans reintroduces “dangers, such as moral hazard or risk transmission, that financial disintermediation
promises to address”). Therefore, this Comment does not address these issues in depth.
34 LendingClub 10-K, supra note 18, at 7.
35 Id. at 41.
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There are many reasons why large sophisticated investors are pushing out
smaller retail investors. Certain provisions of the securities laws exempting
onerous registration requirements likely drove the decision of newer P2P
lenders like Funding Circle and Upstart to only offer investments to accredited
investors in the first place.36 For the legacy P2P lenders like LendingClub and
Prosper, the story is more complex. A survey of large institutional investors
conducted in 2017 indicated that their increased investments were driven
primarily by diversification, the higher yields on these loans, and a desire to
access consumer or small business credit.37
But while a fair amount of blog posts, articles, and studies have been
devoted to the increasing role of institutional investors in P2P lending,
relatively little has been written about the role of traditional banks in this area.
Banks purchased 41% of all LendingClub loan originations during Q4 2018
and are consistently among the highest acquirors of LendingClub’s loans.38
Similarly detailed information is not available for Prosper, but Prosper’s
annual report does indicate that the company is dependent in part on banks as
a third-party funding source for its loans.39
A plausible, albeit speculative, explanation for this could be that banks
increasingly see these P2P lending platforms as a more efficient way to build
their consumer loan portfolios in lieu of originating these loans independently.
Another possible explanation is that P2P lending is simply a form of
“regulatory arbitrage,” allowing traditional lenders, like banks, to participate
in traditional lending activities while avoiding the more costly and stringent
regulations to which they would otherwise be subject.40 Indeed, Hilary Allen
writes that one study by Greg Buchak and others “concluded that the desire to
avoid banking regulation was primarily responsible for the rise of nonbank
consumer lending.”41 Regardless of the reason, the manner in which P2P
lending is increasingly reliant on the traditional banking sector further belies
its original promise as the “killer app” for banking disintermediation.

36 See infra notes 145–148 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 506(c), which exempts
issuers of securities from registration as long as the securities are only sold to accredited investors).
37 Why Institutional Investors Are Turning to Marketplace Loans, LENDINGCLUB (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://blog.lendingclub.com/institutional-insights-into-marketplace-lending/ [https://perma.cc/8BQKB47G] (citation omitted). The survey also found that a majority of investors believe that P2P lending
will be a “significant player in the financial system in the next 10 years.” Id.
38 LendingClub 10-K, supra note 18, at 72.
39 Prosper 10-K, supra note 18, at F-46.
40 See Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 609 (2019)
(outlining concerns that some innovations “are primarily designed to recreate functions already
performed by regulated financial intermediaries while avoiding the relevant regulation (known as
regulatory arbitrage)”).
41 Id. (citation omitted).
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C. Risks and Benefits: The Impact of Alternative Data
The main driver of both the unique risks and benefits posed by P2P lending
is its heavy reliance on alternative data. It appears that P2P lenders’ expansion
of credit to underserved communities is strongly correlated with the use of
alternative data. At the same time, there are serious concerns that this data
could be used to further discriminatory practices. Apart from alternative data,
P2P lending, like all lending, poses other, more traditional risks to consumers.
These risks can come in many forms, from usurious interest rates to hidden
fees to other abusive practices like redlining. Overall, the degree to which
consumers have benefited from P2P lending and its innovative underwriting
practices remains an open question. Some studies indicate that borrowers that
use P2P loans receive similar, or even higher, interest rates relative to
traditional lenders.42 Other empirical research studies conducted on this topic
indicate that borrowers are able to obtain lower overall rates relative to
traditional lenders.43 What is clear, though, is that consumers appreciate these
lenders, judging by the growth in this market.
This Section proceeds by discussing the benefits of P2P lending—specifically,
the clear inroads P2P lenders have made in improving access to credit. This
Section then discusses the risks of P2P lending, focusing mostly on the risks
associated with alternative data in P2P lending.
1. Benefits to Consumers
One of the most important and clearly established benefits of P2P lenders
has been increasing access to credit for traditionally underserved
communities.44 Many of these individuals do not have access to credit because
of their lack of credit history.45 Alternative data, by using other metrics of an
individual’s creditworthiness, has the potential to dramatically expand access to
credit. Banking regulators have recognized this potential. In a 2016 interagency
42 See Robert M. Adams, Do Marketplace Lending Platforms Offer Lower Rates to Consumers?,
FEDS NOTES (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/domarketplace-lending-platforms-offer-lower-rates-to-consumers-20181022.htm [https://perma.cc/E4
BV-UUBA] (summarizing several studies that reveal similar or higher rates in residential lending
markets, German financial markets, and small business loans).
43 See, e.g., id. (“This note provides evidence that credit card borrowers may receive potentially
significant interest rate reductions as a result of obtaining loans from online P2P platforms.”); see
also Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 14, at 18, 26 (“We find that the use of nontraditional information
from alternative data sources has allowed consumers with fewer or inaccurate credit records (based
on FICO scores) to have access to credit.”).
44 See infra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing how a study of LendingClub’s
consumer lending activity showed that the P2P lender was able to offer lower-priced credit to
underserved borrowers).
45 See infra notes 47–50 (discussing the challenges individuals with a lack of a credit score face
in obtaining credit from traditional lenders).
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guidance, the CFPB noted that this “innovative and flexible practice” could
help address “the credit needs of low- or moderate-income individuals” and also
stated that these practices would be considered in evaluating a bank’s
compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).46
The potential for P2P lending to expand access to credit to low-income
and minority individuals could help solve one of the most vexing and
troublesome aspects of U.S. credit markets. A 2015 study by the CFPB
evaluated the demographics of individuals that lack any credit history
whatsoever, who the study deemed “credit invisible.”47 The report also
examined individuals who have a credit history but one that contains too little
information to generate a score.48 Generally, individuals who are credit
invisible or lack a credit score (unscored individuals) are much less likely to
obtain credit from a lender.49 The most revealing component of this report is
the demographic breakdown of credit invisible and unscored individuals:
Almost 30 percent of consumers in low-income neighborhoods are credit
invisible and an additional 15 percent have unscored records. These
percentages are notably lower in higher-income neighborhoods. For example,
in upper-income neighborhoods, only 4 percent of adults are credit invisible
and another 5 percent have unscored credit records. . . . Blacks and Hispanics
are more likely than Whites or Asians to be credit invisible or to have unscored
credit records . . . . These differences are observed across all age groups,
suggesting that these differences materialize early in the adult lives of these
consumers and persist thereafter.50

Of particular concern is that these demographic imbalances persist despite
the fact that lawmakers and regulators have spent decades attempting to
remediate these issues. While major legislation like the Community
Reinvestment Act of 197751 has undoubtedly prevented some of the most
egregious discriminatory lending practices, the continued existence of the
46 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING USE OF
ALTERNATIVE DATA AND MODELING TECHNIQUES IN THE CREDIT PROCESS 12-13 (2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/20170214_cfpb_Alt-Data-RFI.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4W6D-L8ZK] (citation omitted).
47 CFPB OFFICE OF RESEARCH, DATA POINT: CREDIT INVISIBLES 4 (2015), https://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf [https://perma.cc/X764-WC35].
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 6.
51 Pub. L. No. 95-128, §§ 801-806, 91 Stat. 1111, 1147-48. The Act was enacted in 1977 “to prevent
redlining and to encourage banks and savings associations . . . to help meet the credit needs of . . . lowand moderate-income neighborhoods.” OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT FACT SHEET 1 (2014), https://www.occ.gov/topics/communityaffairs/publications/fact-sheets/pub-fact-sheet-cra-reinvestment-act-mar-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KKS4-QLLV].
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problem indicates greater structural issues with the credit markets serving
these communities.
P2P lenders show early signs of remediating these structural issues. While
empirical research on this topic is inherently limited given the relatively recent
emergence of P2P lending, the research that has been performed is promising.
A 2017 study of LendingClub’s consumer lending activity indicated that
consumers who might otherwise be denied credit from traditional lenders
based on their credit history were able to obtain lower-priced credit from
LendingClub.52 This study also found that LendingClub was able to penetrate
underserved credit markets, particularly areas experiencing a decline in
banking branches and highly populated areas.53 Notably, bank branch closures
have a disproportionate effect on minority communities.54 A separate
empirical analysis indicates that state laws limiting access to marketplace loans
broadly had the effect of reducing credit availability for low-income
individuals, resulting in a “persistent rise in personal bankruptcies.” 55 Overall,
these studies constitute promising evidence that P2P lenders are succeeding
at increasing credit availability where traditional lenders have failed.
2. Risks to Consumers
P2P lending today is substantially the same as traditional lending.56 As
such, the risks of P2P lending are substantially the same as those associated
with traditional lending. As noted by Paul Slattery in an early piece on P2P
lending, “All borrowers [face the] risk [of] misleading loan terms,
discriminatory or predatory credit determinations, and abusive collection
Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 14, at 26.
See Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Do Fintech Lenders Penetrate Areas That Are
Underserved by Traditional Banks? 14 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 18-13, 2018) (“We
presented evidence that fintech lenders can fill credit gaps in areas where bank offices may be less
available and the local economy may be more challenging.”); Olena Havrylchyk et al., What Drives the
Expansion of the Peer-to-Peer Lending? 6 (LabEx ReFi, Policy Brief 2017-02, 2017), http://www.labexrefi.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2017_02_labex_refi_Policy_Brief_Mariotto_Verdier_havrylchyk
_rahim.pdf [https://perma.cc/RY63-AKME] (“P2P lending platforms have made inroads into counties
that are underserved by banks” and “counties with higher population density . . . experience higher
growth of P2P lending.”).
54 See JASON RICHARDSON ET AL., NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., BANK BRANCH
CLOSURES FROM 2008–2016: UNEQUAL IMPACT IN AMERICA’S HEARTLAND 3 (2017), https://ncrc.org
/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/NCRC_Branch_Deserts_Research_Memo_050517_2.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5N94-QWZB] (“Banking deserts disproportionately impacted minorities, with 25% of all rural
closures in majority-minority census tracts.”).
55 Piotr Danisewicz & Ilaf Elard, The Real Effects of Financial Technology: Marketplace Lending
and Personal Bankruptcy 1 (May 15, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3208908 [https://perma.cc/W7HZ-BKEX].
56 See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text (discussing the increased reliance of P2P
lenders on traditional financial institutions).
52
53
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practices.”57 Furthermore, P2P lenders, like traditional banks and many other
technology companies, collect significant amounts of sensitive customer
information that is at risk in the event of a data breach.58 None of these risks
are unique to P2P lenders and much of the current bank regulatory regime is
structured around reducing these risks.
One aspect of the P2P lending model, however, does pose a unique risk:
the use of alternative data. There are two main risks that will be the focus of
this subsection. First, analysis of alternative data used in P2P lenders’
algorithms indicates that the underlying data may contain significant
inaccuracies. These inaccuracies can lead to improper credit denials or
excessive interest rates for borrowers. Second, because the algorithms used to
assess alternative data are proprietary, it is difficult to determine whether the
algorithms result in discriminatory lending practices. Both of these risks raise
the potential for violations of federal lending laws like the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, the CRA, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
The potential for inaccuracies in the alternative data used in P2P lending
credit decisions can significantly undermine the P2P lending model.
Inaccuracies in traditional credit reporting are well known—a 2012 study by
the Federal Trade Commission found that 26% of consumers had an error on
their credit report and that 5% of consumers had an error serious enough to
affect their credit score by more than twenty-five points.59 Unsurprisingly,
alternative data also suffers from similar inaccuracies. A 2014 study by the
National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) found that reports from alternative
data aggregators60 contained significant errors, such as incorrect addresses,
added or omitted family members, and added or omitted social media
profiles.61 The existence of these errors is of concern because this data is a key
component of the P2P lending underwriting process. Therefore, errors could
result in higher interest rates or denials of credit. This is concerning for credit
invisible and unscored individuals given their lack of credit metrics used in the
traditional loan underwriting process. These errors could undermine a key

57 Slattery, supra note 12, at 245 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-613,
PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING 25 (2010)).
58 LendingClub 10-K, supra note 18, at 33-34; Prosper 10-K, supra note 18, at 29.
59 FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003, at i (2012).
60 The report reviewed information obtained from five big data companies that aggregate a
variety of alternative information on consumers. PERSIS YU & JILLIAN MCLAUGHLIN, NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., BIG DATA: A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT FOR SCORING CONSUMER CREDIT
15-16 (2014). The five companies were Acxiom, eBureau, ID Analytics, Intelius, and Spokeo. Id.
61 See id. at 18 (listing the types of inaccuracies found in reports purchased from Spokeo
and Intelius).
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potential benefit of alternative data: its ability to penetrate traditionally
underserved populations.62
The potential presence of inaccurate information is further exacerbated by
the fact that the consumer may not even know that inaccuracies exist. As noted
by the NCLC, “Most of the information collected is gathered from the
consumer without his or her knowledge.”63 This makes it exceedingly difficult
for the consumer to dispute potentially inaccurate information and for users
of alternative data to assess the validity of such disputes.
Reliance on proprietary algorithms and data also increases the risk of
illegal discrimination. As identified by the CFPB, “Machine learning
algorithms that sift through vast amounts of data could unearth variables, or
clusters of variables, that predict the consumer’s likelihood of default . . . but
are also highly correlated with race, ethnicity, sex, or some other basis
protected by law.”64 This could lead not only to “disparate impact on the part
of a well-intentioned lender” but also provide a means for lenders to engage
in intentional discriminatory practices under the guise of alternative data and
artificial intelligence.65 The NCLC further identified some of the potentially
discriminatory effects attendant to the use of alternative data. For example, a
report from Transunion highlighted the use of zip codes as a proxy for a
consumer’s ability to repay, stating that alternative data is “helpful to [debt]
collectors because it can identify local credit conditions clustered around
common demographics.”66 The Transunion report went further to state that
the use of alternative data for these purposes is especially helpful for
consumers with minimal credit history.67
Alternative data and underwriting algorithms raise complex issues. This
innovative form of underwriting has the potential to expand access to credit
to individuals often overlooked by traditional financial institutions. At the
same time, alternative data creates the risk of suboptimal credit decisions
driven by inaccurate data and outright illegal discrimination.68 These potential
risks, balanced against some of the evident benefits, must be factored into any
discussion of the appropriate regulatory approach to P2P lending. But before
providing normative recommendations for a P2P lending regulatory regime,
it is necessary to first evaluate the current regulatory state.

See supra notes 47–55 and accompanying text.
YU & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 60, at 24.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, at 19.
Id.
YU & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 60, at 28 (citation omitted).
Id.
See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, at 19 (“Alternative data and modeling
techniques could . . . result in illegal discrimination.”).
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
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II. CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME: A PRIMER
The regulation of financial services is complex, and almost all participants
in the financial services market are subject to a patchwork of municipal, state,
and federal regulations. The regulation of P2P lenders is no exception.
However, unlike many other new fintech companies and legacy financial
industry participants, the unique business model of P2P lenders has resulted
in particularly onerous compliance requirements with federal securities laws.
In addition to this, P2P lenders remain subject to the panoply of federal
lending regulations covering debt collection, lending disclosures, and many
other areas, as well as state laws that often either overlap with these federal
regulations or impose more stringent requirements.
A full and complete discussion of the myriad regulations facing P2P
lenders is beyond the scope of this Comment and has already been ably
described in a comprehensive industry overview.69 Instead, this Part will
discuss the two primary ways in which P2P lenders are currently regulated on
the federal level: registration requirements under the federal securities laws
and indirect supervision by the federal banking agencies. It will also highlight
new state-based approaches to regulating fintech firms—including P2P
lenders—which include an effort by the CSBS to develop an integrated fiftystate licensing and supervisory structure. This Part then provides an overview
of new “regulatory sandboxes” and assesses whether sandboxes are an
appropriate approach toward P2P lenders.
A. Securities Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
P2P lenders largely avoided direct regulation by the federal government in
the early days of operation. This changed when the SEC intervened into the
market in 2008 with a cease-and-desist order to Prosper.70 Both LendingClub
and Prosper were ultimately successful in complying with the securities laws.71
69 See generally MARC FRANSON & PETER MANBECK, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, THE
REGULATION OF MARKETPLACE LENDING: A SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL ISSUES (2019),
https://www.chapman.com/media/publication/926_Chapman_Regulation_of_Marketplace_Lendin
g_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWL6-G6PN] (describing the results of an annual survey conducted
by the law firm Chapman and Cutler LLP on marketplace lending and associated regulatory and
securities issues).
70 See Verstein, supra note 4, at 475-76 (noting that the SEC issued the order to Prosper for
failing to register as a public company before selling securities as defined in section 2(a)(1) of the
Securities Act).
71 The two major P2P lenders reacted to regulation by the SEC in different ways. Compare Silla
Brush, Online Lender Lobbies Congress for Industry Consumer Regulator, THE HILL (June 9, 2010, 11:23
PM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/102323-online-lender-lobbies-congress-for-industryconsumer-regulator [https://perma.cc/8H32-TY3Z] (discussing how Prosper aggressively lobbied
Congress to place P2P lending regulation under the CFPB and provide an exemption from the
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However, the impact on the P2P lending market was dramatic: Prosper and
LendingClub were forced to cease offering loans for purchase for
approximately eight months and six months, respectively, while they worked
through registration with the SEC.72 Less-established P2P lenders opted to
withdraw from the U.S. market entirely.73 The most immediate effect of SEC
regulation was consolidation of the U.S. P2P lending market to two
participants and increased entry barriers for any new market entrant.74
While the SEC’s jurisdiction over P2P lenders like LendingClub and
Prosper has not been memorialized, it is generally accepted that the SEC has
jurisdiction over the notes sold by these lenders.75 Both Prosper and
LendingClub originate loans to borrowers and then sell these loans, which
both lenders refer to as “notes,” to private investors. Given this business
model, SEC jurisdiction can be premised either by treating these notes as
investment contracts and applying the Howey test76 or simply by applying the
holding in Reves v. Ernst & Young.77 Reves held that using a term like “note” to
describe a financial instrument creates a rebuttable presumption that the
instrument is a “security” and falls under the purview of the securities laws.78
Overall, the industry has recognized its obligations under the securities laws,
as no P2P lender has argued that the SEC lacks jurisdiction in this area.
Broadly speaking, regulation by the SEC imposes two primary
requirements on P2P lenders that seek to offer notes to nonaccredited
investors. First, the lender must itself register with the SEC even if the lender

securities laws for loan products), with Slattery, supra note 12, at 252 (discussing how LendingClub
was proactive in complying with securities regulation and reached out to the SEC in 2008).
72 Prosper, in compliance with SEC rules, did not offer lenders the opportunity to purchase
notes on its website from October 16, 2008 until it filed a registration statement on July 13, 2009.
See Carl Smith, If It’s Not Broken, Don’t Fix It: The SEC’s Regulation of Peer-to-Peer Lending, 6 BUS. L.
BRIEF (AM. U.) 21, 23 (2010). Similarly, LendingClub “shut down its lending operations from April
7 to October 13, 2008.” Id. (citations omitted).
73 See Slattery, supra note 12, at 257 (noting that Zopa, a U.K.-based P2P lender, left the U.S.
market entirely following SEC intervention).
74 See id. at 258 (estimating that Prosper spent over $5 million in direct SEC compliance costs
and LendingClub incurred roughly $3 million in SEC compliance costs).
75 Even the earliest opponents to SEC jurisdiction over marketplace lenders acknowledged
that the SEC had a strong argument for asserting jurisdiction. See, e.g., Verstein, supra note 4, at
487-88 (acknowledging that there are “plausible arguments” for SEC jurisdiction but arguing that
jurisdiction should not be asserted given strong normative considerations).
76 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (defining an investment contract, for
purposes of the Securities Act, as “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party”); see also Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1, at 513-14 (applying each component of the Howey
test to notes offered by Prosper and LendingClub and concluding that the notes meet this test).
77 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
78 Id. at 65; see also Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1, at 514-17 (concluding that the Reves holding
would cause notes sold by P2P lenders to be considered securities).
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does not offer its own equity for sale to the public.79 Second, a P2P lender
selling to nonaccredited investors must file a supplemental prospectus with
the SEC every time it sells a package of notes.80 The requirement to file
supplemental prospectuses can be quite onerous—in March 2019 alone,
LendingClub filed 120 supplemental prospectuses with the SEC.81 This
process is known as “shelf registration,” and it is utilized by both LendingClub
and Prosper.
The shelf registration process involves significant upfront costs but allows
these lenders to easily and quickly sell their note packages in compliance with
the securities laws.82 Shelf registration for these two large lenders is executed
under Securities Act Rule 415, which allows the lenders to register a generic
block of securities (here, the note packages) and subsequently take these
securities “off the shelf ” when it reaches an agreement to sell the notes to
investors.83 Absent this rule, “each [note package]—because its underlying
borrower, maturity date, and interest rate won’t in combination match those
of any other [note package]—would constitute a distinct series of securities
and would have to be separately registered.”84 The cost of separate registration
would be extremely high, therefore making Rule 415 essential to the operation
of large P2P lenders selling to nonaccredited investors.85
Some relatively recent statutory and regulatory changes have altered this
process, creating a new means for P2P lenders to operate in compliance with
the securities laws. The JOBS Act was enacted in April 2012 and created an
alternative and less onerous means for P2P lenders to comply with the
securities laws.86 The provision of the JOBS Act that is of greatest utility to
P2P lenders is Rule 506(c), which allows lenders “to engage in general
79 See, e.g., LendingClub Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 45 (Apr. 1, 2013) (fulfilling SEC
registration and reporting requirements while noting that “[LendingClub has] no publicly traded
equity securities”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (2018) (requiring every issuer of registered
securities to file an annual report with the SEC).
80 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(a) (2019) (requiring an issuer utilizing a Rule 415 offering “[t]o file,
during any period in which offers or sales are being made, a post-effective amendment to [its]
registration statement”).
81 See Form 424B3 Edgar Search Results for LendingClub Corp., U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html [https://perma.cc/
D3EV-39KS] (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) (search “0001409970” in the Fast Search field; filter by
Filing Type “424B3”).
82 See FRANSON & MANBECK, supra note 69, at 94 (“[Shelf registration] makes registered
offerings of Platform Notes possible . . . . The filing nonetheless seems to impose an unnecessary
expense on [P2P lenders] . . . since P2P investors almost universally will rely upon the platform
website and not on SEC filings to access the terms of their Platform Notes.”).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 147 (explaining that Congress enacted the JOBS Act to exempt small businesses
that engage in crowdfunding from securities registration).
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solicitations of accredited investors without registering their” note packages
with the SEC.87 While sales to accredited investors without registration had
previously been permitted under certain conditions, the JOBS Act was of great
importance because the prior registration exemptions prohibited “general
solicitation.”88 P2P lenders’ core business is sales of notes over the internet,
which could be considered general solicitation.89 As discussed later, new P2P
lender entrants have begun using Rule 506(c) to avoid the costly and timeconsuming shelf registration process.90
Under the current securities law regime, incentives for P2P lenders are clear.
It is unlikely that there will be any specific legislation exempting P2P lenders
from registration under the securities laws, as was once argued for.91 Rather, it
appears that new entrants will rely on the exemptions under Rule 506(c), while
established P2P lenders—like LendingClub and Prosper—will increasingly shift
their business model to one catered more toward accredited investors.92
B. Regulation by the Federal Banking Agencies
The interplay between P2P lenders and the federal banking agencies is
complex and often murky. The extent to which P2P lenders are supervised by
the federal banking agencies is also unclear. Because no P2P lenders are
currently chartered banks,93 they are generally not subject to direct supervision
by federal banking regulators. However, provisions of the Bank Service
Company Act and prior guidance statements by the banking agencies indicate
that such direct supervision is possible. This is due to the extensive relationships
P2P lenders have with banks chartered by state and federal governments.
The academic literature surveyed in this Comment extensively discuss the
SEC’s direct regulation of P2P notes but, to this author’s knowledge, none of
these articles discuss how banking agencies can regulate P2P lenders indirectly.
Indeed, as exemplified by an FDIC Advisory, as well as comments from
Id. at 97.
See Lo, supra note 28, at 93 (discussing the prior private placement exemptions under Rules
506 and 502).
89 See id. (noting that securities offerings made over the Internet “might be deemed by the
SEC to involve general advertising or general solicitation and thus would not qualify for the Rule
506 exemption” and suggesting that to avoid registration, P2P loan platforms would “have to avoid
marketing the securities through [these] channels”).
90 See infra notes 149–151 and accompanying text.
91 See Brush, supra note 71 (discussing how Prosper lobbied Congress for exemption from
registration); see also Verstein, supra note 4, at 522 (outlining a normative argument for why P2P
lenders should be exempt from the scope of the Securities Act).
92 See infra notes 149–151 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of this shift.
93 See Press Release, LendingClub, supra note 8 (discussing LendingClub’s planned
acquisition of a federally chartered bank for the purpose, in part, of establishing a direct
relationship with federal regulators).
87
88
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LendingClub, it appears that even some within the banking industry may fail
to appreciate how P2P lenders are subject to this supervision through their
relationships with banks.94 Regardless of the exact degree of supervision, P2P
lenders are still required to comply with federal laws and regulations over
lending practices. Any violation of these laws or regulations could therefore
result in an enforcement action brought by federal authorities. The result of
this system is that P2P lenders are required to follow federal laws and
regulations over lending, though the extent of their compliance with these laws
and regulations is less closely monitored than banks.
The potential for federal banking agencies to directly supervise P2P
lenders appears to exist—at least to some extent. As noted in Part I, both
LendingClub and Prosper utilize chartered banks to fund their loans before
selling these loans to private investors.95 The primary bank used by both
LendingClub and Prosper is WebBank, a state-chartered bank subject to
federal supervision by the FDIC.96 P2P lenders that utilize chartered banks to
originate loans before repurchasing such loans are technically subject to
examination and enforcement by that bank’s federal regulator. This is because
of the contractual relationship governing the underwriting, originating, and
servicing of loans between the P2P lender and the chartered bank.97 Under the
Bank Service Company Act,
[W]henever a depository institution that is regularly examined by [a] . . .
Federal banking agency . . . causes to be performed for itself, by contract or
otherwise, any services authorized under this Act . . . such performance shall
be subject to regulation and examination by such agency to the same extent as
94 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Financial Institution Letter FIL-49-2015, FDIC Advisory on
Effective Risk Management Practices for Purchased Loans and Purchased Loan Participations (Nov.
6, 2015), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2015/fil15049a.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TCZKCAR] (“In some situations, it is evident that financial institutions have not thoroughly analyzed
the potential risk arising from third-party [nonbank lending] arrangements . . . . [T]his Advisory
reminds FDIC-supervised institutions that third-party arrangements to facilitate the purchase of
loans and participations should be managed by an effective third-party risk management process.”);
LendingClub, Comment Letter on “Supporting Responsible Innovation in the Federal Banking
System: An OCC Perspective” (May 31, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsibleinnovation/comments/occ-lending-club-comment-to-occ-white-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/LUT6JQ8E] (“Although often not fully appreciated, [P2P lending] arrangements [with banks] also bring
a level of oversight to marketplace lending platforms, which become subject to the bank regulators’
third-party relationship standards.”).
95 See LendingClub 10-K, supra note 18, at 8-9 (discussing how LendingClub facilitates its loans
through WebBank, NBT Bank, and Comenity Capital Bank); Prosper 10-K, supra note 18, at 8
(discussing how all Prosper loans are originated through WebBank).
96 See WebBank and Alt Lending’s Perfect Storm, PYMNTS (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.pymnts.
com/news/2015/webbank-and-alt-lendings-perfect-storm/ [https://perma.cc/NP59-EAMT] (describing
WebBank’s status as a Utah industrial chartered bank subject to FDIC oversight and outlining WebBank’s
increasing prominence in the alternative lending space).
97 See infra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
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if such services were being performed by the depository institution itself on
its own premises . . . .98

The effect of this statute is that the federal banking agencies clearly have
the authority to supervise and examine P2P lenders. However, the extent to
which these agencies have exercised this authority remains an open question.
The banking agencies did previously provide some guidance on how this
supervision might come about; however, this guidance was ultimately
rescinded, continuing the opaque regulatory status around P2P lenders.
Nonetheless, it is worth briefly exploring this guidance to gain some insight
into the thinking of federal banking regulators on this topic. In 2016, the FDIC
issued proposed guidance addressing lending arrangements between
marketplace lenders and chartered banks.99 This guidance not only
emphasized a variety of requirements with which banks with significant thirdparty lending arrangements must comply, but it also outlined areas the FDIC
might review for third-party lenders such as LendingClub and Prosper.100 The
guidance made clear that both compliance with consumer protection laws and
protection of consumer information would be areas of focus.101 However, the
guidance was never made final and in 2018, the FDIC proposed retiring it to
inactive status.102
While this now rescinded guidance may provide insight into how the
federal banking agencies might approach these lending arrangements in the
future, the current state of regulatory oversight is now governed by the
broader regulatory guidance on managing third-party risk. This guidance is
focused on the financial institution’s practices in assessing and controlling risk
associated with third parties, performing due diligence, structuring and
reviewing contracts with these third parties, and overseeing their activities.103
While this approach certainly does not foreclose the possibility of bank
examiners specifically reviewing loans originated on behalf of LendingClub
or Prosper, it does not require it. Rather, the focus of the guidance is on the
bank’s management of these relationships. As noted above, “Under the Bank
Service Company Act (BSCA), the FDIC and other federal financial
12 U.S.C. § 1867(c) (2018).
Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Examination Guidance for Third-Party Lending 1
(July 29, 2016), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2016/fil16050a.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9VTF-ERDJ].
100 Id. at 12-14.
101 Id. at 12-13.
102 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Financial Institution Letter FIL-46-2018, FDIC Seeks Comment on
Proposed Retirement of Certain Financial Institution Letters (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/financial/2018/fil18046.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS8M-VC97].
103 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Financial Institution Letter FIL-44-2008, Guidance for Managing
Third-Party Risk (June 6, 2008), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2008/fil08044a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F9T3-VVU7].
98
99
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regulators have statutory authority to regulate and examine the services
performed by third parties . . . .”104 However, it is not clear whether the FDIC
or any other federal financial regulator has exercised this authority with
respect to any P2P lender.105
All this leads to the conclusion that the position of the federal banking
agencies over P2P lending remains unclear. P2P lenders are subject to the same
laws as all lenders, yet they still remain in a gray area of supervision. As Part III
explains, however, the banking agencies are taking a more proactive approach to
fintech companies broadly through new special purpose bank charters.
C. The Evolving Approach of State Regulators
P2P lenders are subject to the regulatory regime of each state in which the
lender operates. The most routine interaction between state regulators and
P2P lenders is through licensing. The exact type of license required and the
costs associated with acquiring licenses can vary significantly across states.106
Additionally, these licenses are required in some states even where the lender
utilizes a chartered funding bank, as is the case with P2P lenders.107 State
regulators appear to have recognized the burden that this complex web of
licensing and compliance requirements places on nonbank financial service
providers. With a particular focus on fintech companies, the CSBS in 2018
announced an initiative to develop an “integrated, 50-state licensing and
supervisory system” for the purpose of “moderniz[ing] state regulation of nonbanks, including financial technology firms.”108 The CSBS recently took a
significant step forward in implementing this initiative by rolling out a
nationwide examination platform for state regulators to use in supervising
fintech companies.109 While not explicitly depicted as such, this CSBS “Vision
104 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 06-015,
FDIC’S OVERSIGHT OF TECHNOLOGY SERVICE PROVIDERS 2 (2006), https://www.fdicoig.gov/
publications/reports06/06-015-508.shtml [https://perma.cc/9MD6-NDA2].
105 The FDIC did recently rely on its authority under the Bank Service Company Act to
pursue an enforcement action against a marketplace lender for engaging in unfair and deceptive
practices. See FRANSON & MANBECK, supra note 69, at 32. The FDIC required the lender to provide
$20 million in restitution for consumers and imposed a $500,000 penalty. Id.
106 For a detailed overview of different licensing requirements for nonbank lenders, see id.
at 60-64.
107 See id. at 62-63 (“Persons who ‘arrange’ loans for others are also covered by the lending
license statute in some states. In some cases, a purchaser or assignee of a Borrower Loan may become
subject to licensing requirements.”).
108 See Vision 2020 for Fintech and Non-Bank Regulation, CONF. ST. BANK SUPERVISORS (June
7, 2018), https://www.csbs.org/vision2020 [https://perma.cc/N6KW-EW9Q] (discussing Vision
2020 as a series of CSBS initiatives which will “result in a regulatory system that makes supervision
more efficient by recognizing standards across state lines”).
109 Press Release, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, State Financial Regulators Launch
Nationwide Technology Platform to Examine Fintechs and Other Nonbanks (Feb. 19, 2020),
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2020” seems to be an effort, in part, to rebut attempts by federal banking
regulators to extend chartering to nonbank fintech firms.
The CSBS’s proposed integrated licensing and supervisory system fits into
a long history of state regulators collaborating to harmonize their differing
regulatory regimes. One example of this collaboration particularly relevant to
P2P lenders was the development and ongoing expansion of the Nationwide
Multistate Licensing System (NMLS), “which is a technology platform that
functions as a system of record for the licensing activities . . . of [sixty-two]
state or territorial government agencies.”110 The U.S. Department of Treasury
has stated that “[t]he NMLS is used by state regulators to reduce duplicative
regulatory requirements, promote greater information sharing and
coordination, and maintain consumer protections and the strength and
resilience of regulated firms.”111 Since its creation in 2008, the scope of the
NMLS has been expanded to encompass money transmitters, consumer
finance providers, and debt collectors.112
Today, a large number of states utilize the NMLS to manage nonbank
licensing and to provide consumers with access to data on nonbank financial
service providers.113 In addition to the expansion of the NMLS, the CSBS
and state regulators also adopted an integrated approach to the supervision
of money-service businesses. To coordinate supervision of money-service
businesses with licenses to operate in multiple states, forty-nine states and
territories entered into an agreement to engage in joint, multistate
examinations of money-service businesses.114 Overall, these past examples of
state coordination provide a roadmap for future efforts by the CSBS and
state regulators.
The means by which the CSBS and state regulators have adopted an
integrated approach toward licensing and supervision of money-service
businesses is relevant to the CSBS’s proposed integrated approach to fintech
firms, including P2P lenders. The CSBS has stated that “[b]y 2020, state
https://www.csbs.org/state-financial-regulators-launch-nationwide-technology-platform-examinefintechs-and-other [https://perma.cc/46NM-T9T5].
110 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION 68 (2018), https://home.
treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities--Nonbank-Financi....pdf [https://perma.cc/UC2N-ZX83] (citation omitted).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 See id. (“As of year-end 2017, 38 states were using NMLS to manage their [money-service
businesses] licenses . . . . Beyond the scope of industries, NMLS has also enabled greater access to
its data through the launch of a publicly available consumer access website in 2010 . . . .”).
114 See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS & MONEY TRANSMITTER
REGULATORS ASSOC., THE STATE OF STATE MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES: REGULATION &
SUPERVISION 11-13 (2016), https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/State%20of%20State%20
MSB%20Regulation%20and%20Supervision%202.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT3L-R7SB].
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regulators will adopt an integrated, 50-state licensing and supervisory system,
leveraging technology and smart regulatory policy to transform the interaction
between industry, regulators and consumers.”115 The CSBS has outlined a sixstep plan to accomplish this lofty goal.116 Of particular interest to this
Comment are, first, the CSBS’s plans to redesign the NMLS to automate new
applicants and enable states to identify higher risks, and, second, the plan to
harmonize multistate supervision of fintech firms.117 The redesign of the
NMLS is already underway with the intent to develop a new NMLS that will
facilitate multistate supervision and increase the amount of disclosure
available to consumers.118 Harmonization of state supervision has begun as
well, with the nationwide rollout of the State Examination System.119 The
purpose of the State Examination System, in part, is to “[s]upport networked
supervision among state regulators” and “[m]ove state supervision toward
more multistate exams and fewer single-state efforts.”120
The modernization efforts by the CSBS could play an important role in
reducing the uncertainty financial services companies face in attempting to
comply with fifty different state regulatory regimes. Furthermore, better and
more efficient supervision and enforcement by state regulators is currently of
essential importance to ensuring compliance with federal lending laws since
P2P lenders are not directly supervised by federal banking authorities.
Because state regulators retain the authority to pursue violations of federal
consumer protection laws against nonfederally chartered banks,121 their role in
policing potential violations of federal consumer protection laws is an
important complement to the limited enforcement resources of the federal
government.122 However, there are also significant weaknesses to the CSBS’s
plan. The resources available to state regulators are spread even more thinly
than those available to their federal counterparts. State regulators are not only

Vision 2020 for Fintech and Non-Bank Regulation, supra note 108.
For an outline of the entire plan, see id.
Id.
Work Begins on Next Generation Technology Platform, CONF. ST. BANK SUPERVISORS (Sept.
7, 2017), https://www.csbs.org/work-begins-next-generation-technology-platform [https://perma.cc/
4B52-FPVA].
119 Conference of State Bank Supervisors, supra note 109.
120 Id.
121 See 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1) (2018) (establishing a cause of action for state regulators to
enforce provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act). But see id. § 5552(a)(2)(A) (“[T]he
attorney general . . . of any State may not bring a civil action in the name of such State against a
national bank or Federal savings association to enforce a provision of this title.”).
122 See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 701 (2011)
(“Proponents of state enforcement emphasize its potential to buttress federal efforts by putting more
‘cops on the beat.’”).
115
116
117
118

2020]

Twenty-First Century Financial Regulation

1037

responsible for supervising all state-chartered banks but also all state-licensed
nonbank financial service providers.123
Another weakness to the CSBS plan is that different states place varying
degrees of value on financial regulation and enforcement. Because the proposed
CSBS system is by its nature voluntary,124 the fact that many state regulators
may not want to pursue active enforcement of state and federal consumer
protection laws could undermine any multistate supervision and enforcement
effort. One example of this antiregulatory attitude at the state level can be seen
in Arizona’s recent push for a “regulatory sandbox” in the state.125 In March
2018, the Arizona legislature passed a law that will “allow financial companies
to bypass state licensing requirements and offer their products and services to
up to 10,000 consumers for a period of two years.”126
The Arizona Attorney General has argued that “[t]he sandbox will allow
entrepreneurs to give new ideas a chance in the real market without incurring
the regulatory costs and burdens that would otherwise be imposed.”127
Consumer protection advocates have been highly critical of this approach,
noting that the “Regulatory Sandbox law imposes few disclosure obligations
on participants.”128 These advocates further argued that the waivers provided
under the Arizona Regulatory Sandbox could result in disclosures that fail to
comply with federal law.129 This lack of disclosure would be exacerbated by the
fact that participants in the sandbox would be exempt from state licensing,
examination, and supervision.
123 The Role of State Financial Regulation, CONF. ST. BANK SUPERVISORS (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.csbs.org/role-state-financial-regulation [https://perma.cc/DA8A-URPA] (“State regulators
are responsible for chartering, licensing and supervising state-chartered banks and non-bank financial
services providers . . . .”).
124 The CSBS is a nonprofit organization that serves as the “national forum [for state regulators]
to coordinate bank and nondepository supervision and to develop regulatory policy.” Complaint at 7,
Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 149531 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2019) (No. 18-02449) [hereinafter CSBS Complaint]. The CSBS cannot
bind member states to its proposals but must instead rely on negotiated cooperative agreements. See,
e.g., Nationwide Cooperative Agreement for State Governance of Non-Depository Supervision art. 2,
§ 2.4, Oct. 7, 2013, https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/State%20Governance%20Agreement
%20Master%20Signature.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EW5-GJ MX] (“Each State Regulator voluntarily
participating in coordinated supervisory processes under this Agreement and the Framework retains
all sovereign rights and independent authorities granted by state law. Nothing in this Agreement shall be
legally binding on any State Regulator.” (emphasis added)).
125 FRANSON & MANBECK, supra note 69, at 11.
126 Id. at 89.
127 Press Release, Ariz. Attorney Gen. Mark Brnovich, Arizona Becomes First State in U.S.
to Offer Fintech Regulatory Sandbox (Mar. 22, 2018), https://azag.gov/press-release/arizonabecomes-first-state-us-offer-fintech-regulatory-sandbox [https://perma.cc/V7ME-YFTG].
128 Kelly Griffith, SW Center for Economic Integrity, Comment Letter on CFPB Proposed
Rule: Policy to Encourage Trial Disclosure Programs 1 (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=CFPB-2018-0023-0028 [https://perma.cc/S8YK-GAJP].
129 Id. at 3.
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The experience of the Arizona Regulatory Sandbox highlights the limits
of the CSBS state-based approach: if we are to rely on the CSBS plan to
ensure nationwide consumer protection, then every state must express the
same commitment. The fact that states vary significantly in their views on the
appropriate level of supervision and enforcement over consumer protection
means that a state-focused approach to nonbank financial firms will likely
never result in consistent application of consumer protection laws.
III. A NEW REGULATORY APPROACH
The current regulatory approach toward P2P lenders is broken. When P2P
lending was still in a nascent state, it was appropriate to heed the advice of
those urging a wait-and-see approach regarding regulation.130 However, P2P
lending has existed for well over a decade and we are now positioned to assess
the best regulatory regime. As has been discussed previously, P2P lending has
arguably produced benefits for consumers but also raises unique consumer
harm concerns.131 Aside from the unique risks presented by P2P lending, this
form of lending increasingly looks simply like a less regulated form of
traditional lending. The vast majority of the loans generated on these platforms
are funded by either banks or sophisticated accredited investors. However,
these lenders are less regulated than traditional bank lenders. The current
regulatory regime is not advantageous for P2P lenders either. Instead of facing
oversight by a single federal agency, P2P lenders must face a complex array of
state-by-state regulation while still ensuring compliance with federal lending
laws. Overall, this structure does not appear to benefit consumers or lenders.
To fix this currently flawed regulatory structure, lenders and regulators
should push for chartering of P2P firms. Several fintech firms have already
pursued state bank charters, indicating that bank charters in the twenty-first
century can benefit nontraditional financial firms.132 Furthermore,
LendingClub is moving forward with a plan to acquire a federally chartered
bank, a clear signal that a national charter will benefit the P2P business
model.133 While some continue to argue that single-point regulation by the
CFPB is the best regulatory approach, the past actions of the CFPB and the

130 See Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 1, at 531 (asserting in 2012 that “[i]n the short-term,
Congress should adopt a wait-and-see approach to regulating P2P lending” and that “[t]he lending
model used by both Prosper and LendingClub is adequately regulated by existing law”).
131 See supra notes 44–68 and accompanying text (describing the risks and benefits that
alternative data offers to consumers).
132 Clozel, infra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing efforts by Square and SoFi to
obtain state industrial loan charters).
133 Press Release, LendingClub, supra note 8.
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current deregulatory emphasis at the agency make such a change unlikely.134
Additionally, as of February 2020, the CFPB faces an “existential threat at the
U.S. Supreme Court” over its potentially unconstitutional structure.135 In
contrast, the OCC has already established a special purpose national bank
charter for fintech firms.
A special purpose bank charter provides several advantages over the status
quo. First, it will ensure that P2P lenders are subject to direct and unambiguous
supervision by a federal banking regulator. This will produce more consistent
compliance within the industry. Second, a national charter will provide P2P
lenders with preemption of state law. There are certainly concerns inherent with
preemption. However, the benefits of preemption for P2P lenders should
outweigh the costs. This is because state-law preemption will incentivize P2P
lenders to opt for national chartering, ensuring that consistent federal
supervision is present for these entities as opposed to inconsistent state
supervision and enforcement. Third, a special purpose bank charter specifically
targeted toward fintech firms will allow for more tailored regulation of these
entities. The specificity of this charter will allow regulators to gain a deeper
understanding of the benefits and risks of these firms and ideally create a strong
regulatory foundation for these firms to grow in the future. Finally, fintech
chartering should produce broader economic benefits by reducing systemic risks
associated with these firms and potentially preventing a future crisis.
Section A of this Part discusses why the current state of regulation over P2P
lenders is inadequate, both under the securities laws and the Bank Service
Company Act. It also argues that regulation by the CFPB, while an appealing
alternative, is unlikely to occur at any time in the foreseeable future. Section B
then argues for federal chartering of P2P lenders, providing a discussion on the
development of the OCC fintech charter and the challenges that a special
purpose charter would face.
A. The Status Quo of Federal Regulation Is Inadequate
The current state of the federal regulatory regime over P2P lenders
consists solely of the application of the securities laws by the SEC136 and
opaque supervision and enforcement by federal banking regulators of P2P
134 For a more contemporary argument that the CFPB should be the single-point regulator for
P2P lenders, see Warren, supra note 9, at 304-305 (noting that the CFPB has a broad mandate and
that single-point regulation is overall more efficient). As I argue in this Comment, while the CFPB
may be best suited to regulate P2P lenders, it is unlikely that it will actually attempt to do so anytime
in the near future.
135 Alison Frankel, Trump’s DOJ Urges Supreme Court to Keep CFPB Up and Running, REUTERS (Feb.
18, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-cfpb-idUSKBN20C2M3 [https://perma.
cc/CSK7-E9GB].
136 See supra Section II.A.
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lenders as third-party service providers.137 This Section rejects the status quo
of federal regulation over P2P lenders as inadequate. First, this Section
evaluates arguments by Benjamin Lo that the securities laws alone are
sufficient for P2P lenders. In evaluating this argument, this Section rejects
the underlying premise that investors, rather than borrowers, are in greatest
need of protection.
Second, this Section evaluates the adequacy of regulating P2P lenders as
third-party service providers under the Bank Service Company Act. This
Section rejects this approach as both underprotective for consumers and
undesirable for P2P lenders. This Section also rejects a regulatory approach
focused on the CFPB based on the pragmatic ground that the CFPB has
shown no intent of intervening in this market.
Finally, this Section takes a deeper look at the new approach of regulatory
sandboxes toward P2P lenders. This Section acknowledges that regulatory
sandboxes may play an important role in fostering nascent financial
technologies. However, it rejects the idea that P2P lenders are appropriate
participants in a regulatory sandbox since the P2P lending business model is
no longer truly “innovative” and, even if it were, the massive scale and reach
of these lenders justifies a more stringent regulatory approach.
1. Is Securities Regulation All We Need?
The application of the securities laws to P2P lenders is unlikely to change.
Much of the early writing on the regulatory regime around P2P lending argued
that these lenders should be exempt from the securities laws, with the CFPB
acting as the sole authority over P2P lending.138 However, the fact that the SEC
asserted itself over P2P lenders more than ten years ago and, since then,
Congress has rejected efforts to exempt P2P lenders from the securities laws
indicates that such an exemption is unlikely to ever come. Furthermore, the need
for such an exemption has been undermined by the JOBS Act, a fact that this
Comment previously addressed139 and will discuss in greater detail below.
In contrast to arguments that sole authority over P2P lenders should be
placed in the CFPB, Benjamin Lo, in a Comment in the Harvard Business Law
Review Online, has argued that the status quo of P2P lending regulation is in
no need of change.140 Lo makes two distinct arguments to support this
See supra Section II.B.
See Slattery, supra note 12, at 236 (“Most P2P lending activity should be exempt from the
SEC’s jurisdiction as it was under the House version of Dodd–Frank.”); Verstein, supra note 4, at
529 (arguing that P2P lenders should be “freed from confines of the Securities Acts” and that
“regulators have hamstrung [P2P lending] with misguided applications of the Securities Acts”).
139 See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
140 See generally Lo, supra note 28.
137
138
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proposition: first, that the expansion of the private placement rules has
reduced the burden of the securities laws and reduced barriers to entry for P2P
lending,141 and second, that investors in P2P notes, rather than borrowers,
require greater protection, thereby making the securities laws the most
appropriate regulatory approach.142 In this Section, I evaluate both arguments.
I conclude that while Lo is correct in his first argument regarding the reduced
burden under the securities laws, the premise of his second argument that
investors require greater protection than borrowers is flawed given the
increased prevalence of sophisticated investors in P2P lending.
Many of the early concerns about the application of the securities laws to
P2P lenders were based on the compliance burden associated with these
laws.143 Paul Slattery, in a Note for the Yale Journal on Regulation, argued that
these compliance requirements could create potentially insurmountable
barriers to entry for new P2P lenders, the effect of which would be the
entrenchment of the two legacy lenders, LendingClub and Prosper.144 In
contrast, Lo has argued that the expansion of private placement exemptions
under the JOBS Act should eliminate concerns about barriers to entry for new
P2P lenders.145 Lo focuses particularly on Rule 506(c), which “permits issuers
to use general solicitation and general advertising . . . when conducting an
offering pursuant to [Rule 506(c)], provided that all purchasers of the
securities are accredited investors and the issuer takes reasonable steps to
verify that such purchasers are accredited investors.”146 Lo argues that this
exemption could be used by new entrants.147 He anticipates that “new entrants
can start with Rule 506(c) to grow their customer base” and “[o]nce they obtain
funding . . . transition to shelf-registration to ensure that their securities enjoy
the full benefits of a registered offering.”148
This argument is at least somewhat supported by the practices of emerging
P2P lenders in this area. Two firms whose experience supports this proposition
are Funding Circle and Upstart. Funding Circle is a P2P lender that started in
the United Kingdom and entered the U.S. market in 2013, shortly after the
141 See id. at 92-95 (arguing that the SEC’s Rule 506(c) and crowdfunding exemption
contribute to the effectiveness of existing SEC regulation of lenders).
142 Id. at 95-97 (asserting that lenders need more protection than borrowers and that the SEC
should intervene on their behalf).
143 See, e.g., Slattery, supra note 12, at 273 (arguing that the burdens of compliance with the
securities laws “weigh heaviest on innovative financial firms in novel spaces”); Verstein, supra note
4, at 510 (“P2P platforms face substantial compliance burdens similar to traditional public company
issuers, despite posing different risks . . . .”).
144 Slattery, supra note 12, at 254-57.
145 Lo, supra note 28, at 92-95.
146 Id. at 93 (citation omitted).
147 Id. at 94.
148 Id.
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passage of the JOBS Act. Unlike Prosper and LendingClub, Funding Circle’s
primary focus is small business loans and has lent over two billion dollars to
small businesses in the United States.149 Funding Circle has stated that it now
has one of the fifty largest small-business loan portfolios in the United States.150
And of key importance to this discussion, all notes issued by Funding Circle to
investors are made under the 506(c) exemption.151
The main problem with Lo’s argument is his claim that investors need
greater protection than borrowers in the P2P lending space.152 To support this
argument, he engages in an empirical analysis that he argues shows that
borrowers on P2P platforms generally obtain lower rates and “appear
relatively free from predatory penalties and collection practices.”153 In
contrast, Lo argues that investors in P2P notes tend to improperly analyze
the “dizzying array of information upon which to base a lending decision,”
incorrectly assess the risk of notes, and make suboptimal investment
decisions.154 This appears to occur despite the fact that a P2P lender, like
Lending Club, generally incorporates disclosed information into loan quality
grades.155 Given this, Lo argues that investors are in need of greater
protection than borrowers and argues that the SEC remains the appropriate
agency to ensure that these protections exist.156
There is a key problem with this analysis and, as a result, the conclusions
reached. The fatal issue is that the data set used in this empirical analysis was
based on loans made between 2007 and 2013.157 Since that time, the
composition of investors in P2P lending platform notes has changed
significantly. Lo’s analysis is based on data from LendingClub and his
conclusions are based on the assumption that individual retail investors

149 Funding Circle US Small Business Loan Portfolio Surpasses Most Banks with $2 Billion Lent
Through Platform, FUNDING CIRCLE (March 1, 2019), https://www.fundingcircle.com/us/resources/
funding-circle-us-small-business-loan-portfolio-surpasses-most-banks-with-2-billion-lent-throughplatform/ [https://perma.cc/BQM4-DH44].
150 Id.
151 See FUNDING CIRCLE SEC., GETTING STARTED AS AN INVESTOR: WELCOME PACKET
FOR INVESTORS 7, https://static.fundingcircle.com/files/us/InvestorGuide_082516-4bc90e87.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SB8D-6TDW] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020) (“Notes are being offered and sold under
the exemption provided by section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act and Regulation D promulgated
thereunder . . . .”); see also Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-rule506htm.html [https://perma.cc/2LQA-TL5L] (last
visited Mar. 29, 2020) (describing Rule 506 of Regulation D as providing “a ‘safe harbor’ under Section
4(a)(2) of the Securities Act”).
152 Lo, supra note 28, at 96-97.
153 Id. at 101.
154 Id. at 102-03.
155 Id. at 103.
156 Id. at 110.
157 Id. at 97.
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comprise the greatest portion of LendingClub note investors.158 However,
today small retail investors make up less than 10% of the investor base at
LendingClub and banks are the largest purchasers.159 This is also the case for
Prosper with 94% of its loans being funded through its “whole loan channel,”
which is only available to accredited investors, many of whom are institutional
investors.160 The fact that the vast majority of P2P note investors are large and
sophisticated undermines the proposition that the greatest risks in these
products fall on investors. Further undermining this argument is
LendingClub’s and Prosper’s increasing reliance on securitizations and whole
loan sales that are exempt from the securities laws.161
Therefore, in stark contrast to Lo’s original premise, the current investor
base of P2P lending platforms indicates that consumer protection is of much
greater concern than investor protection. Large, sophisticated investors
possess the means to fend for themselves when it comes to purchasing P2P
notes. Individual borrowers taking out small dollar, high interest loans,
however, remain vulnerable.162 This fact points to the conclusion that greater
consumer protection is needed.
2. Federal Regulators’ Consumer-Protection Approach Is Inadequate
There are two primary federal regulatory alternatives to an OCC fintech
charter: maintaining the status quo where P2P lenders are regulated as thirdparty service providers or increasing the CFPB’s presence in the P2P lending
area. Both alternatives are inadequate.
As previously discussed, the status quo of regulating P2P lenders as thirdparty service providers is bad for both consumers and lenders.163 From a
consumer protection standpoint, it is unclear the extent to which P2P lenders
are subject to supervision. This opacity fails to provide assurance that federal
authorities are actually enforcing compliance with consumer protection laws
for P2P lenders. This system is also less than ideal for P2P lenders: like a
chartered bank, they remain subject to potential supervision and enforcement
by federal banking agencies but get none of the benefits of a chartered bank,
including the public confidence associated with such charters and the benefits
of state law preemption. Furthermore, the FDIC’s confusing decision to issue
draft guidance on third-party lending, never finalize this guidance, and later
158 See id. at 102 n.73 (noting that a LendingClub memo indicated that individual retail
investors were the predominant investors funding loans in 2010 and 2011).
159 See LendingClub 10-K, supra note 18, at 131 (reporting that in the final quarter of 2018, selfdirected accounts made up 6% of loan origination volume issued, while bank accounts were 41%).
160 Prosper 10-K, supra note 18, at 8.
161 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 56–68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the risks posed by P2P lenders.
163 See supra Section II.B.
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retract this guidance indicates that even the regulators are uncertain about their
exact authority in regulating P2P lenders as third-party service providers.164
The sum result is that all parties under the status quo appear uncertain as to
the actual effect of regulating P2P lenders as third-party providers.
Waiting for the CFPB to assert itself into P2P lending also appears to be
a suboptimal approach, albeit for a different reason—the CFPB, under both
Democratic and Republican administrations, has not shown any desire to
actively regulate this market. Under the Obama administration, it appears that
the CFPB considered taking a more active role in regulating P2P lenders and
took two steps in that direction. First, the CFPB began accepting complaints
on consumer loans obtained from online marketplace lenders, including P2P
lenders.165 Second, the CFPB issued a request for information on the effect of
alternative data on consumers.166 Some in the financial press concluded that
CFPB regulation was imminent.167 However, the CFPB never pursued any
rulemaking or enforcement in this area.
Under the Trump administration, the CFPB has actively sought to scale
back the degree of regulation over P2P lenders and other fintech firms. The
CFPB has signaled this new deregulatory attitude toward P2P lenders in two
ways. First, the CFPB, taking a note from the State of Arizona,168 issued a
proposed rule that would allow fintech firms to participate in a “trial
disclosure program” that would exempt the firm from Federal disclosure
requirements.169 The CFPB has argued that this disclosure program will
164 See supra notes 93–102 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of the FDIC’s
foray into this area.
165 Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Now Accepting Complaints on Consumer
Loans from Online Marketplace Lender (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-now-accepting-complaints-on-consumer-loans-from-online-marketplace-lender/
[https://perma.cc/PVQ4-KDVC].
166 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, at 1.
167 See CFPB Puts P2P Lenders Under the Microscope, FINEXTRA (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.
finextra.com/newsarticle/28578/cfpb-puts-p2p-lenders-under-the-microscope [https://perma.cc/9WHE
-C4TF] (noting that the CFPB is “ramping up the regulatory pressure on the nascent P2P industry” by
having consumers submitting complaints “among the different categories for products and services that
best apply to their situation, whether that be for a ‘mortgage’, ‘consumer loan’, or ‘student loan’”).
168 Notably, Paul Watkins, “a [former] lawyer in the Arizona attorney general’s office who
helped write [the Arizona Fintech Sandbox law], [now] lead[s] the bureau’s Office of Innovation.”
Kate Berry, CFPB Taps Arizona Official to Lead Innovation Office, AM. BANKER (July 18, 2018),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-names-arizona-attorney-to-head-office-of-innovation
[https://perma.cc/HRG4-UDRD].
169 Policy to Encourage Trial Disclosure Programs, 83 Fed. Reg. 45,574, 45,576 (Sept. 10, 2018).
This trial disclosure program was subsequently revised to include all financial services companies that
are considered covered entities for the purpose of CFPB regulations. See Press Release, Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau, CFPB Office of Innovation Proposes ‘Disclosure Sandbox’ for Companies to Test New
Ways to Inform Consumers (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/cfpb-officeinnovation-proposes-disclosure-sandbox-companies-test-new-ways-inform-consumers/ [https://perma.
cc/49N5-QYAM].
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“enhance consumer protection by facilitating innovation in financial products
and services through enabling responsible companies to research informative,
cost-effective disclosures in test programs.”170 Consumer groups, on the other
hand, have vehemently opposed the disclosure program, arguing that it
“allows legal waivers based only on industry cost savings, with no
improvement in consumer understanding and even with potential consumer
harm.”171 The second deregulatory signal that the CFPB made was a no-action
letter sent to Upstart, a P2P lender. The no-action letter was the first in
CFPB history signifying that the CFPB “has no present intent to
recommend initiation of supervisory or enforcement action against Upstart
with respect to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act” over Upstart’s use of
alternative data.172 Overall, these two recent steps by the CFPB indicate that
it has no intention of taking a stronger position in supervising and enforcing
potential consumer protection violations within the fintech industry,
including P2P lending.
3. A Deeper Look at Regulatory Sandboxes
Before addressing normative recommendations for a federal charter
approach, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the increased attention on the use
of regulatory sandboxes for fintech firms. Sandboxes are a recent introduction
to the regulatory toolbox intended to provide “a ‘safe space’ in which businesses
can test innovative products or services without immediately incurring all the
normal regulatory consequences of engaging in the activity in question.”173 The
sandbox approach is popular in foreign financial centers, with one Article
finding that, as of August 2017, at least sixteen foreign jurisdictions had either
operational or announced sandboxes.174 The list of jurisdictions that have
adopted the sandbox approach includes major global financial centers such as
the United Kingdom, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Switzerland.175 Additionally,
three states within the United States have adopted regulatory sandboxes:
Policy to Encourage Trial Disclosure Programs, supra note 169, at 45,576.
Allied Progress et al., Comment Letter on Opposition to Policy to Encourage Trial
Disclosure Program (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/
sites/14/2018/10/group-comments-to-CFPB-trial-disclosure-programs-oct2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9P7X-3LE3].
172 Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Announces First No-Action Letter to
Upstart Network (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpbannounces-first-no-action-letter-upstart-network/ [https://perma.cc/A69B-VEH6].
173 Lee Reiners, North Carolina’s Proposed Regulatory Sandbox Needs Work, THE FINREG BLOG
(May 28, 2019), https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2019/05/28/north-carolinas-proposed-regulatorysandbox-needs-work/ [https://perma.cc/QT5Q-B2C9] (citation omitted).
174 Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart
Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 64-66 (2017).
175 Id.
170
171
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Arizona,176 Wyoming,177 and Utah.178 And as previously stated, the CFPB has
introduced a narrow “sandbox” focused on federally mandated disclosures.179
Notably, while all of these jurisdictions use the term “sandbox,” the features
and operations of these various sandboxes differ dramatically on questions of
what companies qualify for entry, the scope of the sandbox’s coverage, the level
of regulatory compliance for sandbox participants, and the grounds upon
which a sandbox participant loses sandbox privileges.180 Hilary Allen, while
skeptical of the normative arguments for sandboxes, has argued that, to be
effective, a model regulatory sandbox in the United States “must preempt
enforcement actions by individual federal financial regulatory agencies as well
as by the States.”181 This preemption benefit would be coupled with close
ongoing monitoring by an agency and collaborative information sharing
between the firm and the agency.182
One of the preliminary problems with discussing fintech sandboxes, as
noted by Hilary Allen, is definitional: What types of firms should qualify as
“fintechs?”183 This Comment does not engage with the broader and still
ongoing debate of defining the type of “financial innovation” that should
warrant new regulatory approaches like sandboxes.184 However, factors
identified by Zetzsche et al. and by Allen,185 as well as criteria used by
regulatory sandboxes operating in foreign jurisdictions, indicate that a sandbox
would be an inappropriate approach to regulating most P2P lending firms. The
academic literature and regulatory authorities largely agree that fintech firms
that are already regulated entities should not qualify to participate in a
regulatory sandbox. For example, Australia, the United Kingdom, Singapore,
See supra text accompanying notes 125–128.
Reiners, supra note 173.
Id.
See supra notes 168–171 and accompanying text (discussing the CFPB disclosure sandbox).
For a comprehensive discussion of these differences, see Zetzsche, supra note 174, at 69-77.
Allen, supra note 40, at 643.
Id. at 635-36.
See id. at 585 (noting that there exists no definitive category of products and services
qualifying as fintech).
184 See id. at 606-08 (noting that “[i]t is currently a subject of hot debate whether fintech is
sufficiently different from preceding waves of financial innovation to warrant specialized regulatory
attention” and surveying competing views on this point).
185 Based on a survey of sandboxes across numerous jurisdictions, Zetzsche et al. have stated
that before allowing a proposed entrant into a regulatory sandbox, regulators must assess whether
the entrant: (1) offers a financial technology, service, or activity that is innovative and beneficial to
consumers; (2) “has a need for the sandbox, or whether the [product] is already appropriately covered
under existing law and regulation”; and (3) is adequately prepared to participate in a sandbox.
Zetzsche et al., supra note 174, at 69-71. Allen has approved of the selection criteria used by regulators
in the United Kingdom, which require genuine innovation; benefit to consumers; an idea that is
“meant for the [domestic] financial services market”; “a need for testing in the sandbox alongside
the [regulator]”; and “readiness to test.” Allen, supra note 40, at 626.
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
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and the Netherlands, among others, generally only permit currently
unregulated entities to participate in sandboxes while requiring regulated firms
to rely on no-action letters, informal guidance, and waivers.186 As Hilary Allen
has argued, restricting sandbox access to only unregulated entities is supported
by the need to reduce barriers to entry for small, innovative startups:
“[F]inancial regulation is likely to pose a bigger hurdle for hitherto unregulated
startups than it will for firms that are already subject to financial regulation.”187
A second kind of requirement for sandbox participation is that the firm must
offer an innovation that will produce an “identifiable benefit to consumers.”188
These benefits may “take the form of reduced costs, increased efficiency, and
wider access to financial products and services.”189
P2P lenders do not appear to sufficiently satisfy either of these factors to
qualify for entry into a regulatory sandbox. As established earlier in this
article, P2P lenders are already regulated by numerous federal and state
agencies and have been subject to regulation for many years.190 Furthermore,
as I have argued, the business model of P2P lending is no longer innovative.
Rather, it is better characterized as “the new application of technologies to
traditional products or services,”191 namely consumer lending. To the extent
that P2P lending is an innovative product, it is in the way these firms offer
investment opportunities in consumer loans to retail investors and use
alternative data in underwriting loans. Concerning the regulation of the
investment products offered by P2P lenders, the barriers to entry are already
significantly reduced through the private placement rules under the JOBS
Act.192 Additionally, as the investor base in P2P loans skews increasingly
toward large, sophisticated investors, it becomes less apparent that this
business model provides benefits to retail consumers.193 The use of alternative
data by these firms is arguably more innovative. However, given the large size
of most P2P lending firms and the fact that alternative data still hews closely
to many traditional lending metrics, this would be an attenuated justification
for providing P2P lenders with regulatory relief in the form of a sandbox.
Even if one believes that sandboxes are a good policy choice, that view
does not obviate the need for fintech chartering. In fact, it may be quite the
opposite, as regulatory sandboxes tend to go hand-in-hand with fintech
Zetzsche et al., supra note 174, at 73 & n.164.
Allen, supra note 40, at 589.
Id. at 627 (citation omitted).
Id.
See supra Part II (discussing discrete examples of regulation faced by P2P lenders).
Allen, supra note 40, at 606 (citation omitted).
See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text (discussing how the JOBS Act permits certain
lenders to solicit investors without registering their securities with the SEC).
193 See supra notes 28–41 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of sophisticated investors
in the market for financial instruments created by P2P lenders).
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
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chartering. Zetzsche et al. have argued that “Smart Regulation” should involve
four stages: (1) a testing and piloting environment; (2) a regulatory sandbox;
(3) a special charter scheme; and (4) eventually operating under a full
license.194 If the federal government opts to pursue regulatory sandboxes in
the same vein as the United Kingdom, then it seems appropriate for the firms
that participate in the sandboxes, after benefiting from the sandbox’s lowregulatory environment, to enter into a more traditional regulatory
relationship as a chartered financial institution. This approach will not only
help attract and foster innovative firms, but also ensure that consumer
protection remains paramount throughout the firm’s lifecycle.
B. The OCC Fintech Charter—The Best Path Forward
Given the issues with the current regulatory approach toward P2P
lenders, it is time to pursue a new paradigm for regulation.195 This Section
posits that fintech chartering ought to be central to that new paradigm.
Regardless of whether the OCC fintech charter withstands legal challenges,
it appears that chartering for large fintech companies is inevitable. In the
absence of a national fintech charter option, large fintech firms have turned
to alternative charter options. For example, LendingClub is moving forward
with a plan to acquire a federally chartered bank.196 Additionally, both Square,
a payment processor and one of the largest fintech firms, and SoFi, a loanrefinancing fintech firm focused primarily on student loans, have pursued
Utah-based industrial loan company (ILC) charters.197 The move has been
met with some controversy198 but reflects a trend with larger fintech firms
seeing the benefits of chartering.
A special purpose bank charter through the OCC, however, is a better
approach as compared to full-fledged bank chartering. This Section begins by
providing an overview of the OCC fintech charter along with the legal and
policy challenges that have been lodged against it by the New York State
Department of Financial Services (NYSDFS) and the CSBS. This Section

Zetzsche et al., supra note 174, at 98.
The terminology of a “new paradigm” for fintech regulation comes from a piece that broadly
discusses the evolving paradigm for financial regulation. See Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution
of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm? 3-4 (Univ. of Hong Kong Faculty of Law, Research Paper
No. 2015/047, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2676553 [https://perma.cc/
9S9P-78QQ].
196 Press Release, LendingClub, supra note 8.
197 Lalita Clozel, Square’s Bid to be Industrial Bank Inflames ILC Debate, AM. BANKER (Sept. 16,
2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/square-to-apply-for-industrial-bank-inflaming-ilc-debate
[https://perma.cc/AKY4-ZFQC].
198 See id. (discussing opposition to ILC charters by the Independent Community Bankers
of America).
194
195
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then outlines the benefits that an OCC fintech charter will provide to
consumers, the P2P lending industry, and the broader U.S. economy.
1. Background of the OCC Fintech Charter
On December 2, 2016, the OCC announced through a request for
information that it was considering establishing a special purpose national
bank charter for fintech companies.199 On July 31, 2018, the OCC officially
announced that it would “begin accepting applications for national bank
charters from nondepository financial technology companies . . . engaged in
the business of banking.”200 The OCC argued that fintech chartering would
ensure that these companies operate in a safe and sound manner, would
promote regulatory consistency across the financial industry, would strengthen
the federal banking system, and would encourage fair access and inclusion to
financial services.201 Notably, the OCC fintech charter appears to be the first
type of national bank charter provided to institutions that do not receive
deposits; all that is required is that the entity engage in “any . . . activities
within the business of banking.”202
Obtaining a fintech charter through the OCC largely mirrors the charter
application process for national bank charter applicants.203 The charter
application process is split into four phases: (1) a “prefiling phase” that
involves “formal and informal meetings” with the OCC to discuss the
application; (2) a “filing phase, in which the [firms] submit a complete
application”; (3) a “review phase,” where the OCC assesses the adequacy of
the application; and (4) the “decision phase.”204 Applicants are assessed
under a variety of considerations, including the applicant’s ability to
“provide fair access to financial services, . . . promote fair treatment of
199 News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC to Consider Fintech Charter
Applications, Seeks Comment (Dec. 2, 2016), https://occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ2016-152.html [https://perma.cc/5KSY-QR2P].
200 News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Begins Accepting National
Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology Companies (July 31, 2018), https://www.
occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html [https://perma.cc/H6L6-MPFK].
201 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE
NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 2 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/
responsible-innovation/comments/pub-special-purpose-nat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf [https://perma.
cc/CGY5-DD9D].
202 Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 313 F.
Supp. 3d 285, 292 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1) (2019)).
203 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING
MANUAL SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES 3 (2018) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT] (“The OCC
uses its established chartering standards and procedures as the basis for processing applications for all
national banks, including [special purpose national banks].”).
204 Id. at 3-4.
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customers, and . . . ensure compliance with laws and regulations.”205 As part
of the application process, applicants must demonstrate a “commitment to
financial inclusion” and outline detailed “metrics for serving the [firm’s]
anticipated market and community.”206 These elements of the chartering
process make clear that consumer protection and financial inclusion are
among the OCC’s primary considerations.
The fact that many fintech firms have already been operating for several
years with established operational track records should smooth the fintech
charter application process. While the OCC has yet to issue a fintech charter,
several fintech companies have reportedly expressed interest in such a charter.
As of the writing of this Comment, “Online lender Avant is said to be in ‘latestage discussions’ concerning the approval of an [OCC] Fintech charter.”207
Additionally, Robinhood, an online investment platform, was also reportedly
seeking a fintech charter.208 And while the outcome of these reported
discussions is yet to be determined, the interest in the OCC fintech charter
indicates that it will be increasingly utilized by large firms in the fintech area.
2. Legal Challenges Against the OCC Fintech Charter
The CSBS and the NYSDFS were early and vigorous opponents to the
OCC fintech charter, going so far as to mount separate legal challenges
against the charter. In challenging the OCC fintech charter, both the CSBS
and the NYSDFS argued that the OCC’s decision to issue fintech charters
exceeded its statutory authority under the National Bank Act (NBA).209 The
CSBS filed two separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, while the NYSDFS lawsuit was filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Both of the
CSBS’s lawsuits were dismissed on the grounds that the CSBS lacked
standing and its claims were unripe.210 The NYSDFS, in contrast, was much
Id. at 5.
Id. at 10.
JD Alois, After Years of Debate, Avant May Be the First to Receive an OCC Fintech Charter,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Apr. 12, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/
2019/04/146290-after-years-of-debate-avant-may-be-the-first-to-receive-an-occ-fintech-charter/
[https://perma.cc/U9DR-PFY3].
208 Mark Calvey, Exclusive: Robinhood Seeks Regulatory Approval to Create a National Bank, S.F.
BUS. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2019/04/19/robinhoodfintech-bank-savings-checking-accounts.html [https://perma.cc/MLJ7-8HSS].
209 See Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 280 (S.D.N.Y.
2019); Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 313 F.
Supp. 3d 285, 293 (D.D.C. 2018).
210 Conference of State Bank Supervisors, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 296 (“CSBS fail[ed] to plead an injury
that is ‘certainly impending’ or that exposes its members to a ‘substantial risk.’”); see also Conference
of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 18-2449, 2019 U.S. Dist.
205
206
207
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more successful in Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.211 In Vullo,
the court held not only that the NYSDFS had standing and its claims were
ripe, but also that the NBA “unambiguously requires that, absent a statutory
provision to the contrary, only depository institutions are eligible to receive
national bank charters from OCC.”212
With now two differing positions on the ripeness of the lawsuits against the
OCC, and the legal status of the fintech charter generally in question, the OCC
has filed an appeal to the Second Circuit.213 While the procedural issues related
to standing and ripeness are clearly very relevant to the ongoing lawsuit against
the OCC and its fintech charter, the focus of this subsection will be the
substantive claims upon which the NYSDFS prevailed in its lawsuit.
The central legal issue in the dispute over the fintech charter is what
constitutes the “business of banking.”214 The OCC has consistently argued that
the “business of banking” is ambiguous. The OCC provided its interpretation
of the allegedly ambiguous term in 2003 when it promulgated a final rulemaking
that amended 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1) “to require limited purpose national banks
to conduct at least one of the following core banking functions: (1) Receiving deposits;
(2) paying checks; or (3) lending money.”215 In the final rulemaking, the OCC
stated that “[t]he purpose of [the] proposed change was to clarify that a limited
purpose national bank may exist with respect to activities other than fiduciary
activities, provided the activities in question are part of the business of
banking.”216 Judge Marrero, who wrote the opinion in Vullo, disagreed with the
OCC’s 2003 final rulemaking. In Vullo, he held that the “business of banking” is
not ambiguous and clearly entails deposit taking.217
The opinion by Judge Marrero offers an excellent outline of the arguments
against the OCC in this case, as well as a thorough overview of many of the
cases relevant to assessing the breadth of the OCC’s regulatory and chartering
power. At the same time, however, there were two debatable arguments made
within the opinion, both of which could likely be pressed by the OCC on its
appeal. First, Judge Marrero quickly dismissed the holding in a much earlier
LEXIS 149531, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2019) (“The Court will grant the [OCC’s] motion to dismiss
because CSBS continues to lack standing and its claims remain unripe.”).
211 378 F. Supp. 3d at 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Facing a motion to dismiss against three counts, the
NYSDFS was allowed to proceed with two of the three. Id. at 278.
212 Id. at 298.
213 Notice of Appeal, Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271 (No. 18-8377) [hereinafter Vullo Notice of Appeal].
214 CSBS Complaint, supra note 124, at 4.
215 Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Bank Activities and Operations;
Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,122, 70,126 (Dec. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 5) (emphasis added).
216 Id.
217 Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 292 (“The Court finds that the term ‘business of banking,’ as used
in the NBA, unambiguously requires receiving deposits as an aspect of the business.”).
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case from the D.C. Circuit that addressed substantially the same issues. That
case was Independent Community Bankers Ass’n of South Dakota v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System,218 and one of the central issues there
was whether the OCC had the statutory authority to charter a “special
purpose” national bank that would initially engage in only one enumerated
banking power, namely consumer credit card lending.219 In holding that the
OCC did possess the power to charter this type of “special purpose” national
bank, the court stated that “[t]here is nothing in the language or legislative
history of the National Bank Act that indicates congressional intent that the
authorized activities for nationally chartered banks be mandatory” and that
the OCC may charter a national bank with restricted activities unless such
restrictions would “undermine[] the safety and soundness of the bank or
interfere[] with the bank’s ability to fulfill its statutory obligations.”220
As Judge Marrero noted in Vullo, courts in the Second Circuit are not
bound by decisions from other circuits; therefore, he did not need to follow
the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Independent Community Bankers Ass’n.221 Judge
Marrero further stated that, even if the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning on this point
were correct, it still would not permit the OCC to charter nondepository
institutions, as receiving deposits is a statutory obligation of national banks. 222
However, this interpretation of the D.C. Circuit’s language in Independent
Community Bankers Ass’n is debatable. Unfortunately, it is unclear what the
D.C. Circuit had in mind when it stated that restrictions on national bank
activities should not undermine “the bank’s ability to fulfill its statutory
obligations.”223 What seems clear, though, is that these “statutory obligations”
do not include the enumerated powers of national banks like extending credit
and receiving deposits as provided under the National Bank Act.224 This
conclusion can partly be reached linguistically: an obligation is defined as a
“legal or moral duty to do or not do something,”225 while a power is defined as
the “ability” or “legal right” to act or not to act.226 Therefore, on this analysis,

820 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 431, 439.
Id. at 440.
Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 297 n.12.
Id. at 297. In the same paragraph, Judge Marrero also seemed to indicate that Independent
Community Bankers Ass’n is inapplicable because “in any event, it appears the banks at issue there did
take deposits.” Id. However, as noted in the OCC’s reply brief in Vullo, “[T]he D.C. Circuit placed
no weight on the fact, mentioned in passing, that the national bank intended to offer limited deposittaking . . . .” Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint at 8, Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271 (No. 18-8377).
223 Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass’n, 820 F.2d at 440.
224 See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2018) (laying out the corporate powers of national banking associations).
225 Obligation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
226 Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
218
219
220
221
222
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though a national banking association may possess the legal right to receive
deposits, it is under no legal duty to receive deposits.
The court’s interpretation of Independent Community Bankers Ass’n is also
inconsistent with the logic of the opinion. In Vullo, Judge Marrero wrote that
“the proposition that deposit-receiving . . . is optional” does not follow from
the holding in Independent Community Bankers Ass’n.227 However, this seems to
be precisely what follows from the holding of Independent Community Bankers
Ass’n because the issue in that case was whether the Comptroller of the
Currency could issue a national charter to a bank that would initially only
engage in consumer credit card lending.228 On that question, the D.C. Circuit
answered “yes.”229 What does seem clear is that the holding in Vullo and the
holding in Independent Community Bankers Ass’n are in conflict. It remains open
to debate which opinion reached the correct conclusion on the scope of the
OCC’s chartering authority.
The second argument that the OCC will likely press on appeal is that the
court in Vullo gave too little weight to the holding in NationsBank of North
Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., a Supreme Court opinion that
evaluated the phrase “incidental powers . . . necessary to carry on the business
of banking” in the NBA and found it to be ambiguous.230 At issue in
NationsBank was whether the OCC reasonably interpreted the term
“incidental powers . . . necessary to carry on the business of banking” to allow
national banks to sell annuities.231 In holding that the term was ambiguous and
that the OCC’s interpretation was reasonable, the Supreme Court stated that
[i]t is settled that courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction
of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of
that statute. The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement
of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with
respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.232

In its brief to the court in Vullo, the OCC noted that “NationsBank marked
a watershed in construing the term ‘business of banking’ . . . by rejecting a
narrow interpretation [of the statute], instead deferring to the ‘expert financial
judgment’ of the Comptroller.”233

Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 297.
Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass’n, 820 F.2d at 439.
Id. at 440-41.
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256 (1995).
Id.
Id. at 256-57 (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1987)).
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 14,
Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (No. 18-8377).
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The court in Vullo, however, found that NationsBank was not relevant to
whether the OCC had the power to charter nondepository institutions. The
court stated that NationsBank simply stands for the proposition that the outer
bounds of what constitutes “the business of banking” is ambiguous.234 The
court went on to note that “[i]t does not follow from the uncertainty
surrounding the outer bounds of the term . . . that the threshold
indispensability (or not) of deposit-receiving . . . is necessarily ambiguous.”235
Judge Marrero’s logic on this point seems reasonably sound. However, it
arguably gives too little weight to the broad discretion the Supreme Court
afforded to the Comptroller’s interpretation of the NBA. As argued by the
OCC in its reply brief in Vullo, “Although NationsBank addressed the
permissible limits of the term ‘business of banking’ ‘beyond those specifically
enumerated,’ that context had no bearing on the Court’s granting deference to
the Comptroller in interpreting this ambiguous term.”236
As previously noted, the OCC has appealed the decision in Vullo.237 The
extent to which the Court should defer to the Comptroller in interpreting the
NBA is still an open question, and one that will be central to the OCC’s
appeal. The OCC’s decision to issue charters to nondepository fintech firms
arguably pushes the outer boundaries of its authority under the NBA, as
exemplified by the now-conflicting precedents in the D.C. and Second
circuits. The ongoing litigation will continue to be closely watched by the
financial services and fintech industries. This close attention reflects the
significance of the OCC fintech charter. But of equal importance, given the
steep cost of pursuing a national bank charter and the risk that such a charter
may be held to be invalid, many fintech firms may be dissuaded from pursuing
a charter until these questions are resolved.
3. Policy Challenges to the OCC Fintech Charter
The CSBS in its separate lawsuit also asserted several policy-based
critiques of the OCC fintech charter. The CSBS has argued that the OCC
“charter lacks transparency, will preempt important state consumer
protections, and will slow business innovation by advantaging larger players
over small firms.”238 In support of these policy arguments, the CSBS contends
that the OCC’s decision to extend preemption of state antipredatory lending
Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 297-98.
Id. at 298.
Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint at 8, Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271 (No. 18-8377) (citation omitted).
237 Vullo Notice of Appeal, supra note 213.
238 John W. Ryan, The OCC Fintech Charter, CONF. ST. BANKING SUPERVISORS (June 1, 2017),
https://www.csbs.org/occ-fintech-charter [https://perma.cc/8FSC-PG4J].
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laws to nondepository mortgage subsidiaries of national banks laid “the legal
foundation for the subprime lending abuses that bore out during the financial
crisis.”239 The CSBS argues that the Dodd–Frank Act was enacted in part to
limit the OCC’s authority to preempt state consumer protection laws.240 The
CSBS concludes by arguing that state regulators are best situated to regulate
these nonbank entities and foster innovation.241
The CSBS’s policy-based claims against the OCC fintech charter are
suspect on several fronts. The CSBS is correct to criticize the role that the
OCC and the now-defunct Office of Thrift Supervision played in failing to
intervene in the increasingly dangerous subprime mortgage market leading up
to the financial crisis. However, it can hardly be contended that state
regulators were not equally complicit. State regulators largely acquiesced to
lobbying by state-chartered banks to either not regulate subprime loans
originated by these institutions at all or to waive antipredatory laws over
subprime loans.242 Furthermore, the complaint by the CSBS acknowledges
that the Dodd–Frank Act “limit[ed] the OCC’s authority to preempt state
consumer financial laws . . . through the imposition of new procedural and
evidentiary requirements and heightened standards of review.”243 The risk of
any gaps in consumer protection laws that could be created by preemption of
state law is also clearly remedied by one of the main pillars of the Dodd–Frank
Act: the CFPB. P2P lenders and other fintech firms, like all participants in
the financial industry, are subject to rules promulgated by the CFPB pursuant
to its rulemaking authority.244 And the CFPB, if it sees fit in the future, could
assert its authority to supervise and examine P2P lenders and other firms if it
determines that these firms are a “larger participant of a market for other
consumer financial products or services.”245 Overall, the legislative reforms put
into place under the Dodd–Frank Act should more than mitigate the past
deficiencies that the CSBS focuses on in its complaint.
4. Fintech Chartering—A Twenty-First Century Solution
Fintech chartering is the best available regulatory approach for P2P
lenders. Chartering will benefit consumers by ensuring a uniform regulatory
CSBS Complaint, supra note 124, at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Federal Preemption and Consumer Financial
Protection: Past and Future, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 25, 30 (2012).
243 CSBS Complaint, supra note 124, at 16 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)–(d), (g) (2018)).
244 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (2018).
245 Id. § 5514(a)(1)(B). Notably, because the OCC fintech charter does not require charter
applicants to take deposits or obtain deposit insurance, the CFPB could not exercise its supervisory
powers under § 5515, as that section only applies to large insured depository institutions.
239
240
241
242
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approach to these lenders and consistent application and enforcement of the
federal consumer protection laws. Furthermore, federal preemption will
reduce the burden of complying with the hodgepodge of complex state laws.
Regulators benefit from chartering, since it allows them to develop a
functional approach to fintech firms and gain greater insight on the benefits
and risks of these firms. Finally, looking forward, chartering for fintech
companies broadly, including P2P lenders, reduces the potential that excess
risk will build up in this largely unsupervised area of the financial sector.
The focus of this Comment has been consumer protection in P2P lending.
While a national fintech charter may present some consumer protection
risks,246 it remains the best available option for ensuring consumer protection
in P2P lending. Chartering P2P lenders will produce two broad benefits for
consumers. First, national chartering will ensure that all consumers in the
United States are afforded the same degree of protection under consumer
protection laws. The current state-based regulator approach does not provide
parity. Some states, like California and New York, have been aggressive in
enforcing consumer protection laws.247 At the same time, other states like
Arizona have opted to abdicate enforcement of these laws entirely.248
Nationwide supervision and enforcement by the OCC would mitigate this
problem and ensure that all consumers receive the same degree of protection
regardless of their state of residence.
Second, violations of consumer protection laws will be identified and
mitigated earlier under a regulatory regime that involves fintech chartering.
Under the current system of regulating fintech firms, violations of consumer
protection laws are largely addressed through enforcement actions pursued by
state attorneys general or federal agencies. This manner of enforcement is
incredibly inefficient and typically only arises when a great degree of
consumer harm has already occurred. Under a chartering system, chartered
fintech firms would be subject to routine examination by prudential bank
regulators. These examinations would provide a key means to identify and stop
potentially harmful practices early.
The benefits that will accrue to consumers through chartering are
obviously contingent on P2P lenders (and other fintech firms) actually taking
advantage of the charter. There are reasons to believe that chartering will be
appealing to P2P lenders. First, and likely most importantly, a national bank
246 See supra notes 209–217 and accompanying text (discussing the NYSDFS’s and CSBS’s legal
arguments against the OCC fintech charter); notes 238–245 and accompanying text (discussing the
CSBS’s policy arguments against the OCC fintech charter).
247 FRANSON & MANBECK, supra note 69, at 19-21 (discussing the generally aggressive
approach of California and New York regulators toward fintech firms).
248 See supra notes 125–129 and accompanying text (discussing Arizona’s regulatory sandbox for
fintech firms).
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charter preempts state laws over licensing and supervision.249 This will save
P2P lenders the costs associated with complying with a myriad of differing
state regulatory regimes, as well as the risk of noncompliance with these
varying state laws. Second, a special purpose national bank charter will likely
provide P2P lenders with access to the Federal Reserve discount window and
the U.S. payments system.250 Access to the discount window would allow P2P
lenders to obtain low-cost funding in the event of a short-term liquidity
crunch. Access to the payments system would lower transaction costs for P2P
lenders. Third, obtaining a special purpose national bank charter now would
simplify the process of obtaining federal deposit insurance in the event that a
P2P lender decides to become a full-service banking organization. While the
business model of P2P lending in theory involves investors ultimately funding
loans made on the platform, LendingClub and Prosper are increasingly
holding a significant portion of loans originated through the platform and
utilizing borrowings to fund these assets.251 Insured deposits would provide a
lower-cost form of funding and could be appealing to P2P lenders as their
business model evolves. It appears that all three of these factors were major
considerations in LendingClub’s recent decision to pursue an acquisition of a
federally chartered bank.252

249 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2018) (preempting national banks from examination by state
regulators); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2019) (same); 12 U.S.C. § 25b (preempting national banks from
state laws regarding loan terms, interest rates, disclosure, and other laws); 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007–
7.4008 (same); see also DAVIS POLK, BEYOND FINTECH: THE OCC’S SPECIAL PURPOSE
NATIONAL BANK CHARTER 2 (2016), https://www.davispolk.com/files/2016-12-9_occs_special_
purpose_national_bank_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/S97Q-PRM5] (“In general, pursuant to
preemption regulations issued by the OCC implementing Sections 1044–1046 of the Dodd–Frank
Act, state laws or requirements are preempted when they conflict with the exercise by a national
bank of its federally granted powers.” (citations omitted)).
250 There is some debate as to whether the Federal Reserve would provide fintech firms with
special purpose national bank charters access to these services. See Rachel Witkowski, Fed Will Have the
Say on Key Parts of OCC’s Fintech Charter, AM. BANKER (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.american
banker.com/news/fed-will-have-the-say-on-key-parts-of-occs-fintech-charter [https://perma.cc/7VGUJGJS]; see also DAVIS POLK, supra note 249, at 8 (discussing the Federal Reserve’s historical skepticism
of “commercial companies controlling banking organizations.”).
251 LendingClub 10-K, supra note 18, at 135-37 (showing that as of December 31, 2018, LendingClub
had the following debt obligations associated with its operations: warehouse borrowings of $338.9 million;
revolving debt of $95 million; repurchase agreements of $57 million; securitization notes held by third
parties and classified as debt totaling $256.2 million; and $81.1 million in secured borrowings); Prosper
10-K, supra note 18, at F-30 (indicating that as of December 31, 2018, Prosper had total debt of $162.5
million). Prosper also noted in a 2019 press release that it has “significantly diversified [its] funding
sources through new institutional and bank investors on [its] platform, $500 million of committed
warehouse facilities” and its securitization program. Prosper Reports Full Year 2018 Financial Results,
PROSPER (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.prosper.com/about-us/media/2019/03/29/prosper-reports-fullyear-2018-financial-results/ [https://perma.cc/H4SC-EVJK].
252 See Press Release, LendingClub, supra note 8 (stating that the proposed acquisition would
enhance LendingClub’s resilience by offering low-cost insured deposits and deliver regulatory clarity).
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An OCC fintech charter also allows federal regulators to become more
familiar with this new generation of financial service providers and tailor its
regulatory approach to the particular risks presented by each firm. William
Warren, utilizing a framework developed by Professor Steven Schwarcz, has
argued that regulators should take a functional approach to regulating the P2P
lending market and adapt their approach to the unique risks of these lenders. 253
As the OCC has made clear, “The scope of supervision activities will follow a
risk-based approach commensurate with the size and complexity of the
institution, focusing on any elevated risks and unique supervisory challenges
presented by a [special purpose national bank].”254 Inherent in this approach
is tailoring supervision of fintech firms to the unique risks posed by those
firms. Expanding supervision also means that OCC examiners will be present
at these institutions, allowing for greater data collection and risk assessment.
Finally, chartering may help prevent, or at the very least reduce the impact
of, a financial crisis stemming from fintech companies. While this Comment
has focused on consumer protection risks rather than systemic ones, it is
worthwhile touching on the potential systemic risks presented by fintech.
William Magnuson has outlined three acute problems posed by fintech firms
from a systemic risk perspective:
First, fintech firms, because of their size and business model, are more
vulnerable to adverse economic shocks than large financial institutions, and
those shocks are more likely to spread to other firms in the industry. Second,
fintech firms are more difficult to monitor and constrain than typical financial
institutions because regulators lack reliable information about the structure
and operations of fintech markets. Third, fintech markets suffer from
collective action problems that inhibit cooperation among market actors.255

A special purpose national bank charter for fintech firms would be
particularly useful in addressing each of these potential risks. Chartered
fintech firms, like regular national banks, would “be subject to the minimum
leverage and risk-based capital requirements in 12 C.F.R. § 3 that apply to all
national banks.”256 Capital requirements should help harden fintech firms to
such adverse economic shocks. Additionally, examinations by prudential
regulators should provide a means to spot potentially risky interconnectedness
between fintech firms before these risks blow up into a crisis. These
examinations will also mitigate the second risks identified by Magnuson, as
regulators will be well-positioned to monitor those fintech firms that pursue
253
254
255
256

Warren, supra note 9, at 312-15.
COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 203, at 14.
William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1171-72 (2018).
COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 203, at 8.
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chartering. Finally, the greater role of regulators in this space would
undoubtedly help mitigate collective action problems. Through chartering,
regulators will be better positioned as a centralized player among all chartered
fintech firms, allowing them to marshal resources and push collective action
in the event of a crisis.
CONCLUSION
P2P lending has transformed over the course of the twenty-first century,
and the regulatory structure around it must also transform. Consumers have
benefited from P2P lending in the form of increased access to credit and
possibly lower rates of borrowing. However, this area of lending presents
unique risks in the form of alternative data. Furthermore, as P2P lending
increasingly becomes dominated by traditional financial intermediaries like
banks and institutional investors, arguments that this new technology must be
protected and fostered become increasingly attenuated. Rather, the primary
concern for regulators today should be the consumer protection risks attendant
to P2P lending. As this Comment has argued, the current regulatory regime
around P2P lending is ineffective: securities regulation does nothing to protect
consumers, regulation under the Bank Service Company Act is too opaque,
and a state-based approach faces severe collective action problems.
Fortunately, a regulatory approach focused on chartering P2P lenders
addresses many of these issues. A special purpose national bank charter will
ensure greater supervision of P2P lenders but also provide sufficient
incentives, in the form of state-law preemption, to appeal to these lenders.
Additionally, chartering will produce secondary benefits by bringing these
institutions out of the “shadow banking” world, allowing for greater regulatory
knowledge of these entities and reducing systemic risk. Ultimately, chartering
is the best way to allow P2P lenders to continue their impressive growth in a
manner that ensures compliance with consumer protection laws.
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